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NOTES 
State and Local Limitations on Ballot Measure Contributions 
Despite the Supreme Court's observation that referendums 
demonstrate "devotion to democracy,"1 some state and local govern-
ments have tempered their citizens' direct democratic participation 
by limiting contributions to ballot measure committees? At least 
one court3 has held that these limitations violate the first amend-
ment,4 but in Citizens Against Rent Control v. City ef .Berkeley5 
I. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 141 (1971) (upholding amendment to California's con-
stitution requiring referendum approval of publicly financed low-income housing). 
2. See, e.g., FLA. STAT.§ 106.08(l)(d) (1979); Berkeley, Cal., Election Reform Act of 1974, 
§ 602 (Ord. No. 4700-N.S.) (June 4, 1974). 
A "ballot measure" is an electoral question submitted to the people for approval or rejec-
tion by popular vote through the referendum or initiative process. A referendum involves a 
constitutional amendment or statute that the legislature has referred to the people for approval 
or rejection. An initiative, on the other hand, is proposed by the citizens themselves and sub-
mitted for popular approval. See REFERENDUMS, A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PRACTICE AND 
THEORY (D. Butler & A. Raney eds. 1978) [hereinafter cited as REFERENDUMS]. 
A "ballot measure committee" is a committee, group, or association, formed to urge the 
electorate to vote for or against a particular ballot measure. A "ballot measure limitation" is a 
dollar limitation on the amount that individuals or groups can contribute to ballot measure 
committees. 
3. Let's Help Florida v. McCrary, 621 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1980), appeal filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 
3625 (U.S. Dec. 12, 1980) (No. 80-970) (striking down a $3,000 limitation imposed on contri-
butions for statewide ballot measures under FLA. STAT.§ 106.08(l)(d) (1979)). 
Several courts have held statutes prohibiting corporate spending in connection with ballot 
measures unconstitutional. See C. & C. Plywood Corp. v. Hanson, 583 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 
1978) (holding unconstitutional under the first amendment a state statute prohibiting corporate 
spending for political communication bearing on ballot measure questions); Schwartz v. 
Romnes, 495 F.2d 844 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding that :r,ew York statute prohibiting corporate 
payments "for any political purpose whatsoever'' must be construed narrowly so as not to 
prohibit corporate contributions to ballot measure committees). 
4. U.S. CONST. amend. I states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of 
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for 
a redress of grievances." 
5. 27 Cal. 3d 819,614 P.2d 742, 167 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1980),prob.juris. noted, IOI S. Ct. 1344 
(1981) (No. 80-737). The appellant in CARC was an unincorporated association formed to 
oppose a proposed amendment to the Berkeley City Charter that would have established a 
citywide rent control board. The committee accepted contributions totalling $108,000. Some 
$18,600 of this was received in violation of the $250 limit. See Brief for Appellants at 5 n.4, 
CARC, 27 Cal. 3d 819, 614 P.2d 742, 167 Cal. Rptr. 84 (1980) (on file with the Michigan Law 
Review) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Apps.]. Berkeley, Cal., Election Reform Act of 1974, 
§ 602 (Ord. No. 4700-N.S.) (June 4, 1974) limited contributions to $250, and § 604 provided 
that organizations must surrender contributions in excess of the limitation to the Berkeley City 
Treasury. 
Section 602 of the ordinance was declared invalid on its face and summary judgment for 
the plaintiff citizens' committee was granted at the trial court level. Summary judgment was 
upheld on appeal, 99 Cal. App. 3d 736, 160 Cal. Rptr. 448 (Ct. App. 1979). The California 
Supreme Court reversed without remanding for further findings of fact. See CARC, 27 Cal. 3d 
at 835, 614 P.2d at 751-52, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 93-94 (Richardson, J., dissenting): 
1421 
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(CARC), the California Supreme Court approved a $250 ceiling on 
municipal ballot measure committee contributions. The court relied 
on Buckley v. Valeo,6 which upheld the Federal Election Campaign 
Act's7 (FECA) limitations on contributions to candidates and candi-
date authorized campaign committees, but invalidated its direct 
spending limitations. The California court concluded that ballot 
measure limitations are constitutionally permissible because ballot 
measure contributions resembled the candidate contributions that 
Buckley held could be restricted. 
This Note's thesis is that ballot measure limitations unconstitu-
tionally infringe upon the rights of free speech and association. Part 
I analyzes Buckley and concludes that the CARC court misapplied 
its distinction between contributions and direct expenditures. Part II 
tests ballot measure limitations against Buckley's "exacting scrutiny" 
standard. 8 It identifies the state interests asserted in defense of ballot 
measure limitations - lessening abuse by narrow interest groups, 
reducing apathy, and equalizing political expression - and con-
cludes that ballot measure limitations do not permissibly further 
these governmental interests.9 
There is no record before us and in this connection the procedural posture of the case 
should be noted. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the citizens' com-
mittee which attacked the ordinance. Assuming, only for purposes of analysis, that the 
trial court was improvident in the entry of its summary judgment invalidating the ordi-
nance, it is manifestly unfair for the majority . . . to sustain the ordinance without afford-
ing the citizens' committee an opportunity to challenge or rebut the [evidence] ... on 
which the majority wholly relies. 
6. 424 U.S. I (1976) (per curiam). 
7. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 
(codified in scattered sections of 2, 5, 18, 26, 47 U.S.C.) (amending Federal Election Campaign 
Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified in scattered sections of 2, 18, 47 
U.S.C.), as amended by Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
283, 90 Stat. 475 (codified in scattered sections of 2, 18, 26 U.S.C.). 
8. See text at notes 18-19 infra. 
9. A sufficiently important state interest will justify abridgment of first amendment rights 
because "neither the right to associate nor the right to participate in political activities is abso-
lute." United States Civil Serv. Commn. v. National Assn. of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 
567 (1973) (upholding the Hatch Act's prohibition against federal employees actively partici-
pating in political management or political campaigning) . .But see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 
at 1, 27 n.2 (emphasizing "that [the Hatch Act provision reviewed in Letter Carriers] did not 
restrict an employee's right to express his views on political issues and candidates"). 
Additionally, the regulation in question must in fact further the interest asserted in justifi-
cation of the regulation. See, e.g., Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516,525 (1960) ("[N]o 
relevant correlation between the power of the municipalities to impose [license taxes] and the 
compulsory disclosure and publication of' membership lists); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Pat-
terson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (holding that forced disclosure of civil rights group's membership 
list had no "substantial bearing" on the asserted state interest of monitoring compliance with 
foreign corporation registration statute). 
The regulation also must avoid unnecessary abridgment of first amendment rights. The 
Court generally refers to this requirement as the "less drastic means test." See, e.g., United 
States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967) (holding statute barring all Communist party members 
from working in defense factories invalid; restriction of first amendment freedoms of associa-
tion more extensive than necessary to accomplish purpose of statute); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 
U.S. 479 (1960) (invalidating state statute requiring teachers to disclose every organization of 
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I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT INTERESTS 
A. Buckley v. Valeo: A Constitutional Framework 
The Supreme Court's 1976 decision in .Buckley v. Valeo 10 pro-
vides a starting point for constitutional analysis of ballot measure 
limitations. In .Buckley, the Court tested the constitutionality of the 
1974 Amendments to the FECA. 11 Reacting to Watergate,12 Con-
gress had amended the Act to police the financing of the political 
process. 13 The amended Act imposed limitations on contributions to 
candidates and candidate authorized campaign committees, 14 and on 
direct expenditures by individuals and groups "relative to a clearly 
identified candidate."15 In a long per curiam opinion the Court up-
held the contribution limitations, 16 but struck down the restrictions 
which they were members over five-year period on the ground that the "interference with 
[freedom of association] goes far beyond what might be justified in the exercise of the State's 
legitimate inquiry"). 
Ordinarily, the Court simply invalidates the legislation, but in some cases it has specified a 
"less drastic means." See, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943). See generally 
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 722-24 (1978); Note, Less .Drastic Means and the 
First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464, 471 (1969). Under the "less drastic means" approach, the 
government bears the burden of showing that legislation infringing upon first amendment 
rights is no broader than necessary to accomplish a legitimate end. See, e.g., Talley v. Califor-
nia, 362 U.S. 60, 66 (1960) (concurring opinion); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939) 
(rejecting the contention that a statute broadly infringing first amendment rights should be 
upheld because it accomplishes a legitimate state interest "more efficiently?' than a narrower 
statute). 
10. 424 U.S. I (1976) (per curiam). 
11. See note 7 supra. 
12. For a brief summary of the history of the Watergate investigation, see 2 CONGRES-
SIONAL QUARTERLY, INC., DOLLAR PoLmcs 12 (1974). 
13. The 1971 amendments were an attempt to correct the deficiencies of existing legislation 
in curbing campaign financing abuse. The commentators generally agree that the existing 
legislation was wholly ineffective. See, e.g., D. ADAMANY & G. AGREE, POLITICAL MONEY 
43-61 (1975). 
For a detailed analysis of the provisions at issue in Buckley, see Comment, Buckley. v. 
Valeo: The Supreme Court and Federal Campaign Reform, 76 CoLUM. L. REV. 852 (1976). 
Congress was apparently aware of the unprecedented scope of the amendments and provided 
for expedited review. 2 U.S.C. § 437h(a), (b) (1976 & Supp. III, 1979) (providing that constitu-
tional questions under the Act could be certified to court of appeals sitting en bane with direct 
appeal to the Supreme Court). 
14. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendment of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, § IOl(A), 
(B), 88 Stat. 1263 (repealed 1976). 18 U.S.C. § 608(b)(4)(a) stated that "contributions to a 
named candidate made to any political committee authorized by such candidate, in writing, to 
accept contributions on his behalf shall be considered to be contributions made to such candi-
date .... " 
15. Section 608(e)(l) limited such expenditures to $1,000. 18 U.S.C. § 608(e)(I) (Supp. IV 
1974) (repealed 1976). These limitations were applicable to natural persons, partnerships, 
committees, associations, corporations, "or any other organization or group of persons." 18 
U.S.C. § 59l(g) (Supp. IV 1974) (repealed 1980). In order to avoid impermissible vagueness, 
the Court construed the "relative to a clearly identified candidate" qualification to include 
only "communications that include explicit words of advocacy of election or defeat of a candi-
date." 424 U.S. at 43. So narrowed, the Court found the limitation incapable of accomplish-
ing the asserted purpose of closing any "loopholes" left open by the contribution limitations. 
16. Contributions to both candidates and candidate authorized campaign committees will 
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on direct spending.17 
The Buckley Court initially posited that the first amendment sub-
jects limitations on expression and association to "exacting scru-
tiny."18 It then held that the Act's limitations on spending for 
political communication regulate speech and not conduct. 19 Candi-
date contribution and direct expenditure limitations, however, do 
not restrict speech to the same extent. Direct expenditure ceilings 
be referred to hereinafter as "candidate contributions." Limitations on candidate contribu-
tions will be referred to as "candidate limitations." 
17. 424 U.S. at 58-60. 
18. 424 U.S. at 16. The Court has often cited Buckley for the proposition that regulations 
infringing first amendment rights are subject to "exacting scrutiny." See, e.g., First Natl. Bank 
v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 n.23 (1978); Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976) (plurality 
opinion) {holding patronage dismissal practice violative of first amendment rights of political 
belief and association). "It is firmly established that a significant impairment of First Amend-
ment rights must survive exacting scrutiny." (citation omitted). 
It can be argued, however, that the Court did not scrutinize the candidate limitations as 
carefully as it claimed. For example, the Court did not inquire whether the elimination of 
direct corruption could have been achieved with less first amendment infringement by estab-
lishing higher contribution limitations. The Court stated that "Congress's failure to engage in 
such fine tuning does not invalidate the legislation." 424 U.S. at 30. Similarly, the Court 
upheld the overall contribution limitation on the ground that this provision was necessary to 
prevent evasion of the basic contribution limitation. 424 U.S. at 38. 
The court exhibited similar deference to congressional determination of the necessary 
scope of legislation effectuating a legitimate governmental interest when it upheld limitations 
on the partisan political activity of federal employees in Civil Serv. Commn. v. National Assn. 
of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973). In both Buckley and Lei/er Carriers, the statutes ad-
dressed the day-to-day administration of the federal system and the conduct of national level 
candidate elections - processes with which Congress is presumably most familiar. Deference 
to congressional judgment in these areas is particularly appropriate. The Berkeley City Coun-
cil, however, probably did not possess similar expertise with regard to the broad and largely 
unanswered questions of political alienation and voter apathy. The CARC court's deference to 
the city council's assessment of the relationship between large contributions to ballot measure 
committees and voter apathy therefore seems inappropriate. See CARC, 27 Cal. 3d at 831,614 
P.2d at 749, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 91. 
19. The court below held that both contribution and direct expenditure limitation~ were 
regulatable as conduct under United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). Buckley v. Valeo, 
519 F.2d 821, 840 (D.C. Cir. 1975). In O'Brien, the Court rejected a draft card burner's claim 
that his activity was protected under the first amendment. Under the O'Brien test, legislation 
or government action affecting s_peech is valid if: (1) the regulation is within the constitutional 
power of the government; (2) the regulation furthers an important government interest; (3) the 
government interest is unrelated to the suppression of expression; and (4) the incidental restric-
tion of first amendment rights is no greater than necessary. 391 U.S. at 377. The Buckley 
Court rejected the contention that spending money for political communication was regulat-
able as conduct: 
The expenditure of money simply cannot be equated with such conduct as destruction of a 
draft card. Some forms of communication made possible by the giving and spending of 
money involve speech alone, some involve conduct primarily, and some involve a combi-
nation of the two. Yet this Court has never suggested that the dependence of a communi-
cation on the expenditure of money operates itself to introduce a nonspeech element or to 
reduce the exacting scrutiny required by the First Amendment. 
424 U.S. at 16. 
The Court also stated that even if spending were treated as "conduct," the limitations 
would fail under the O'Brien test because "the governmental interests advanced in support of 
the Act involve 'suppressing communication.'" 424 U.S. at 17. See generally Henkin, Tire 
Supreme Court, 1967 Term - Foreword· On .Drawing Lines, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63, 79 (1968) 
( criticizing the "speech-conduct" distinction). 
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reduce "the quantity of expression by restricting the number of is-
sues discussed, the depth of their exploration and the size of the au-
dience reached."20 The Court thus concluded that these limitations 
intolerably restrained political speech.21 
Candidate limitations, in contrast, only marginally restrict a con-
tributor's ability freely to communicate.22 Four arguments favored 
this conclusion. First, the link between the size of candidate contri-
butions and the quantity of a contributor's communication is tenu-
ous, "since the expression rests solely on the undifferentiated, 
symbolic act of contributing."23 Second, individuals and groups 
often contribute to candidates for reasons unrelated to their political 
viewpoints. A contributor might donate because of loyalty to the 
candidate or the candidate's party,24 or in the hope of "purchasing" 
impermissible influence should the candidate be elected.25 The dol-
20. 424 U.S. at 19. The Court found that expenditure limitations prevent citizens and 
groups other than candidates, political parties, and the press from using the "most effective 
modes of co=unication." 424 U.S. at 19-20. 
The practical reality of the modem political process is that it costs a good deal of money to 
battle effectively in the political arena. See generally D. ADAMANY & G. AGREE, supra note 
13, at 19-27. The Court recognized that any limitation on spending for political co=unica-
tion significantly curtailed expression: 
Mirtually every means of co=unicating ideas in today's mass society requires the ex-
penditure of money. The distribution of the humblest handbill or leaflet entails printing, 
paper, and circulation costs. . . . The electorate's increasing dependence on te1evision, 
radio, and other mass media for news and information has made these expensive modes 
of communication indispensable instruments of effective political speech. 
424 U.S. at 19. See note 54 infra. 
21. 424 U.S. at 39, 58-59. 
22. 424 U.S. at 20-21. 
23. 424 U.S. at 21. In the Court's words, candidate contributions provide "a general ex-
pression of support for the candidate and his views," but do not "co=unicate the underlying 
basis for the support." 424 U.S. at 21. 
24. Often loyalty to a candidate does not involve a corrupt motive; instead it amounts to 
reflexive support. See D. TRUMAN, THE GOVERNMENTAL PROCESS 309 (2d ed. 1951) (quoting 
V. KEY, SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION 470-71 (1949)): 
Most speculation [as to corrupt motivation in making a candidate contribution] has been 
by i>rofessors and newspaper reporters, persons to whom $25 is a wad of money, and it is 
doubtful that they achieve a sophisticateo comprehension of the motivation, attitudes, and 
expectations of persons who can blithely throw $5,000 in the pot to help elect old Joe, a 
college classmate, a drinking companion, and a fellow Rotarian, without being any the 
poorer. 
Individuals that identify strongly with one of the two major political parties are far more 
likely to make contributions to candidates than individuals who do not profess loyalty to a 
particular party. See Adamany, The Sources ef Money: An Overview, 425 ANNALS 17, 19-20 
(1976). 
25. The problem lies in distinguishing between a contribution that merely amounts to 
"support" and a contribution that is the "quid" in the Buckley Court's quid pro quo. The 
difficulty is probably best recognized by Congresspersons themselves: "The distinction be-
tween a campaign contribution and a bribe is almost a hairline's difference. You can hardly 
tell one from the other." 120 CONG. REc. 10,351 (1974) (remarks of Senator Inouye, quoting 
Senator Long). 
Ordinarily, of course, the contributor's motivation would be irrelevant to the first amend-
ment interests involved in making the contribution. But where the magnitude of the contribu-
tion suggests that an individual contributor could have secured effective political 
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lar amounts of contributions made for these reasons are only weakly 
linked to actual political expression. Third, contributions may not 
result in any political expression unless spent by a candidate or asso-
ciation to present views to the voters. 26 
Finally, if a contribution does produce speech, the "transforma-
tion . . . into political debate involves speech by someone other than 
the contributor."27 A candidate contribution is an open-ended 
grant. 28 Because candidates must appeal to broad segments of the 
electorate, they cannot serve as surrogate speakers for contributors.29 
And contributors, expressing "general support" for the candidate 
and his positions,30 neither demand nor expect communication of 
their viewpoints.31 Even speech made possible by a contribution, 
therefore, is likely to reflect the candidate's, and not the contribu-
tor's, viewpoint.32 For these reasons, the Buckley Court concluded 
that "contribution ceilings . . . serve the basic governmeµtal interest 
in safeguarding the integrity of the electoral process without directly 
impinging upon the rights of individual cit12ens and candidates to 
engage in political debate and discussion."33 
Buckley's distinction between direct expenditures and candidate 
contributions is based not on mere form, but on the substantive im-
co=unication through direct expenditures, the prospect of corruption between contributor 
and candidate may justify contribution limitations. 
26. 424 U.S. at 21. 
27. 424 U.S. at 21. 
28. A contribution made directly to the candidate by the contributor is clearly in the nature 
of a grant. If a contribution is not an open-ended grant, but is instead conditioned upon later 
favorable treatment, the candidate's conduct in accepting the contribution would be tanta-
mount to corruption. Similarly, contributions made to "candidate authorized committees," see 
note 14 supra, are controlled by the candidate, or by individuals who are ultimately accounta-
ble to the candidate - generally professional media managers. See generally Nimmo, Po/ilica/ 
Image Makers and the Mass Media, 427 ANNALS 33 (1976). See also A. HEARD, THE COSTS 
OF DEMOCRACY 408-22 (1960), for a discussion of the structure and function of candidate 
campaign organizations and the processes involved in "transforming" contributions into polit-
ical co=unication. 
29. For an anecdotal account of how a candidate attempts to increase general support 
among voters without at the same time making any commitment to specific segments of the 
electorate, see Lorenz, An Insider's View of Jerry Brown, EsQUIRE, Feb. 1978, al 66. 
30. 424 U.S. at 21. 
31. One example of a "contribution" that did not result in expression of the contributor's 
viewpoint was the American Telephone and Telegraph Company's $1.5 million contribution 
to the Democratic National Co=ittee forgiving a debt of that amount incurred for services 
rendered in the 1968 election. See Miller v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759 (3d Cir. 
1974). Contributions may also be used to finance illegal activities, see, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL 
QUARTERLY, INC., supra note 12, at 9-15, or to enrich the candidate, see, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL 
QUARTERLY, INC., CONGRESSIONAL ETHICS 39-41 (1977). 
32. It is possible, of course, that an individual contributor's political opinion might be so 
close to the candidate's that the contributor would have a fundamental free speech interest in 
making unlimited contributions. As a practical matter, however, few contributors, if any, will 
have political positions that precisely match those of the candidate across the entire range of 
issues that the candidate will address during the campaign. 
33 .. 424 U.S. at 58. 
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pact of these restrictions on speech. Candidate limitations are per-
missible because they only minimally curtail the contributor's 
speech; direct expenditure ceilings are invalid because they substan-
tially restrain individual political expression. The .Buckley distinc-
tion thus affirms the first amendment interest in individual speech.34 
But the distinction is also consistent with the Court's view that the 
first amendment should promote ''uninhibited, robust and wide open 
debate" on public issues.35 Although .Buckley upheld the Act's con-
tribution limitations, the Court implied that even these limitations 
34. See generally T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6 (1970): "First, 
freedom of expression is essential as a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment. The 
proper end of man is the realization of his character and potentialities as a human being." The 
Supreme Court has recognized that the first amendment's protection can be premised in some 
cases solely on the interest of the speaker in self-expression. See First Natl. Bank v. Bellotti, 
435 U.S. 765, 777 n.12 (1978). The Court has held that first amendment protection of individ-
ual expression extends to unorthodox or "symbolic" speech. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 
403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (expression that communicates message in a manner that some individ-
uals might find offensive protected under the first amendment); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 
576 (1969) (reversing conviction of individual who burned flag on street comer while dis-
traught over the death of civil rights leader). But cf. New Rider v. Board of Educ., 480 F.2d 
693 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1097 (1973) (upholding the indefinite suspension of na-
tive American Indian students for failure to conform with school hair-length regulations; no 
substantial constitutional question presented). See generally Nimmer, Tire Meaning of Sym-
bolic Speech Under the First Amendment, 21 UCLA L. REV. 29, 61 (1973). 
Other first amendment scholars have argued that the first amendment's protection flows 
from "the necessities of the program of self-government." See A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL 
FREEDOM 26-28 (1948) (purpose of first amendment is to protect the freedom of ideas so that 
individuals may capably govern themselves). See also Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First 
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. l, 25 (1971) (first amendment protection should be limited 
to speech that is "politiC!il"). 
35. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). See generally Kalven, The 
New York Times Case: A Note on "Tire Central Meaning of the First Amendment", 1964 SUP. 
CT. REV. 191. 
Under this doctrine, the speaker need not "possess" first amendment rights to be protected, 
because the Court also seeks to prevent governmental interference with the "marketplace of 
ideas." For example, the Court has protected corporate speech on commercial and political 
matters. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Commn., 447 U.S. 557, 562 
n.5 (1980) (utilities enjoy the "full panoply" of first amendment rights for comment on issues 
of public importance); First Natl. Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777-78 (1978) (striking down 
complete prohibition of corporate spending for political communication; whether corporations 
possess first amendment rights coextensive with those of natural persons not relevant). 
The marketplace metaphor is surely the most durable of first amendment boilerplate -
probably because it has centuries of respectable philosophical support. See Cox, Tire Supreme 
Court, 1979 Term -Foreword· Freedom of Expression in the Burger Court, 94 HARV. L. REV. 
1, 2 (1980). Although it is far from clear that the framers were convinced of the value of such 
an approach, see, e.g., L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION (1960) (suggesting that framers 
would have prohibited much speech that is protected today); J. MADISON, The Federalist No. 
JO, in THE FEDERALIST 53 (1941) (1st ed. New York 1788) (danger of factions to orderly 
course of representative government), philosophers of the framer's era believed that unfettered 
critical discourse led to truth. See Mill, On Liberty, in THE GREAT LEGAL PHILOSOPHERS 380, 
385 (C. Morris ed. 1959). 
The Supreme Court has echoed this belief: 
The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a society as diverse and 
populous as ours. It is designed and intended to remove governmental restraints from the 
arena of public discussion, putting the decision as to wliat views shall be voiced largely 
into the hands of each of us, in the hope that use of such freedom will ultimately produce 
a more capable citizenry and more perfect polity and in the belief that no other approach 
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could not be set so low as to impede "robust and effective" political 
discussion. 36 
The Buckley Court also considered whether contribution and di-
rect expenditure limitations infringed upon the right of political as-
sociation. 37 As it did when discussing freedom of expression, the 
Court distinguished between the two types of limitations. Direct ex-
penditure ceilings prevent most associations "from effectively ampli-
fying the voice of their adherents."38 Thus, constraints on the ability 
of groups and organizations to make unlimited expenditures inter-
fere with members' first amendment associational rights.39 Candi-
date limitations, on the other hand, less severely restrict protected 
freedom of association. First, such limitations do not prevent as-
sociations from aggregating large sums of money to promote eff ec-
tive advocacy. Second, candidate limitations affect only "one 
important means of associating with a candidate or committee." A 
would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our political 
system rests. 
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971). Justice Holmes believed that a free marketplace 
of ideas was not only desirable, but also constitutionally ordained: 
[T]he ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas - that the best test of 
truth is the power of thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, that at 
any rate is the theory of our Constitution. 
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
36. 424 U.S. at 21. 
37. 424 U.S. 22-26. Although the Constitution does not expressly guarantee a right of 
association, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965), the right has long been 
recognized, see generally Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 14 
YALE LJ. 1 (1964), and has been vigorously protected. 
Legislation that "may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the 
closest scrutiny." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 25 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Pat-
terson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958)). 
The Court has stated time and time again that restriction of the right to associate with 
others is subject to the same rigorous scrutiny as restrictions on other first amendment rights. 
See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209,233 (1977); Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 
347, 356, 362 (1976) (plurality orinion) (holding that the practice of dismissing government 
employees on basis of party affiliaiion must be limited to employees in "policymaking posi-
tions"); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 263-65 (1967) (right of association "ranks among 
our most precious freedoms," and state must show a compelling interest to justify infringe-
ment). Although the Court originally protected the right of association in cases involving state 
legislation that appeared to be motivated by a desire to harass unpopular groups, recent deci-
sions make it clear that the application of strict scrutiny is appropriate regardless of legislative 
motivation or the severity of the infringement. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); Healy 
v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 183 (1972). 
Two policies underlie the Court's protection of the freedom to associate. First, this free-
dom makes the exercise of first amendment rights more effective. See generally VOLUNTARY 
AssocIATIONS (NoMos XI J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1969). The Buckley Court noted 
that "[e]ffective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial 
ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association." 424 U.S. at 15 (quoting NAACP v. 
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958)). Second, freedom of association is pro-
tected to ensure that individuals do not suffer any loss of first amendment rights because they 
exercise their rights with others. See T. EMERSON, supra note 34, at 22; Raggi, An Independent 
Righi lo Freedom of Association, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 15 (1977). 
38. 424 U.S. at 22. 
39. 424 U.S. at 22 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957)). 
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contributor remains "free to become a member of any political asso-
ciation and to assist personally in the association's efforts on behalf 
of candidates."40 
This Note tests the validity of state and local restrictions on con-
tributions to ballot measure committees. Buckley's distinction be-
tween contribution and expenditure limitations in federal candidate 
elections provides the basic analytic framework. If form rather than 
substance controls the decision, courts should uphold ballot measure 
limitations. But Buckley requires analysis of the substantive impact 
of spending limitations on speech and association. Section B argues 
that ballot measure limitations impinge upon first amendment rights 
as substantially as the direct expenditure ceilings that Buckley invali-
dated. 
B. Contributions to Ballot Measure Committees 
Ballot measure limitations substantially restrain first amendment 
rights. Ballot measure contributions are much like direct expendi-
tures, but have little in common with candidate contributions. This 
section develops that theme in four important respects. 
First, citizens form ballot measure committees solely to urge the 
passage or defeat of a referendum proposal.41 In candidate elections, 
few contributors share the candidate's views on all political issues. 
But ballot measures generally present a narrower range of issues 
than do candidate elections.42 Contributors to ballot measure com-
40. 424 U.S. at 22. 
41. The available research clearly indicates that citizen based or "grass roots" ballot meas-
ure co=ittees are ad hoc affairs, organized for the limited purpose of addressing specific 
ballot measure propositions. See s. LYDENBERG, BANKROLLING BALLOTS 52-53, 61-62 (1979); 
REFERENDUMS, supra note 2, at Role of Initiatives in California's Environmental Politics, 28 
W. PoL. Q. 352, 359, 360-70 (1975). A recent empirical study of several ballot measure elec-
tions nationwide suggests that controversial issues involving the economic interests of an entire 
industry (e.g., anti-smoking measures, "bottle-bills," nuclear power plant construction or siting 
measures) are likely to spark the formation of ballot measure committees that coordinate the 
expenditure of contributions from large corporations throughout the country. These coalitions 
of convenience presumably dissolve after the ballot measure election. See S. LYDENBERG, 
supra. For the view that corporate contributions to ballot measure co=ittees affect the out-
come of ballot measure elections, see IRS Administration of Tax Laws Relating to Lobbying 
(Part I): Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the Comm. on Government Operations, 95th Cong., 
2d Sess. 256-73 (1978) (statement of John Schockley). For the view that corporate contribu-
tions can be limited, but not prohibited, see Co=ent, The Constitutionality of Limitations on 
Corporate Contributions If! Ballot Measure Campaigns, 13 U.S.F. L. REv. 145 (1978). 
42. See, e.g., S. LYDENBERG, supra note 41, at 60-63 (describing the passage of a "dentur-
ism" measure; "denturism" is the practice of allowing dental technicians, rather than only 
licensed, professional dentists, to perform measurement and fitting of dental plates). Of 
course, not all ballot measure questions are single issue-a__ffairs as narrow in scope as the "den-
turism" question. See REFERENDUMS,supra note 2, at 94-95 for a content breakdown of ballot 
measure questions in California. In deciding whether to build a nuclear power plant, for ex-
ample, the voter may have to balance possible environmental gains against possible economic 
losses. See S. LYDENBERG, supra note 41, at 35. Similarly, ballot measure questions relating 
to fair-housing laws and low-income housing projects raise many issues - the desirability of 
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mittees stand squarely behind the committee's message - "yes" or 
"no" on a specific proposal. Because ballot measure contests are is-
sue specific, an individual contributes with one or few issues in 
mind,43 and can choose the committee that best expresses his posi-
tion. If existing committees advocate opposing positions or promote 
popular positions with unpersuasive arguments, individuals are free 
to form their own ballot measure committees. 44 
Second, ballot measure contributors generally seek only to ad-
vance their political views. Neither party or candidate loyalty nor 
the hope of gaining impermissible influence with elected officials af-
fects an individual's decision to support a ballot measure committee. 
Ballot measure contributors' political expression is as pure in this 
respect as the "core"45 political speech of direct spenders. The likeli-
integration, the possible instability of property values, and the effect that such projects might 
have on local fiscal capacity. 
43. Although ballot measure elections are not always single issue affairs, see note 42 supra, 
they usually generate fewer and more sharply delineated issues than candidate elections. In 
fact, political observers have criticized this very aspect of ballot measure elections. See Bever-
age Container Reuse and Recycling Act of 1977: Hearings on S. 276 before the Subcomm. for 
Consumers of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 95th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 124 (1978) (statement of Dana Duxbury) (arguing that intensive lobbying of industry on 
"bottle bill" referendum in Massachussetts resulted in the measure's defeat; advertising one-
sided and erroneous). Ironically, the apparent trend toward one-sided, simplistic political 
communication may result from the fact that "single issue" political controversies often arise 
out of disputes concerning more fundamental value choices - an example of this would be the 
death penalty question. But the tendency to focus ballot measure communication on one, or at 
most a few, issues seems just as pronounced where the question posed to the voters is "techni-
cal": 
Increased complexity of measures leads quite naturally to simplification by sponsors and 
opponents seeking to persuade an amorphous public. The result ... is the need for mas-
sive financial resources fol- public relations firms and television, billboard and newspaper 
advertising that usually tely more on simplistic propaganda than on reasoned discourse. 
Baker, American Conceptions of .Direct vis-a-vis Representative Governance, CLAREMONT J. 
PUB. AFF. 5, 13 (1977) (quoted in REFERENDUMS, supra note 2, at 104). 
The same tendency is, of course, present to some extent in candidate elections. See 
Nimmo, supra note 28, at 42. But in candidate elections the voter will generally confront a 
wider range of issues than in ballot measure elections. In addition to the candidate's general 
political outlook and positions on specific controversies, the voter will also consider the candi-
date's personality, integrity, and past performance, whether in or out of office. Id. at 37. Fur-
thermore, the campaign itself is often a fertile source of issues as candidates vie with each 
other to improve their image among voters. See, e.g., D. BooRSTIN, THE IMAGE 7-44 (1961) 
( candidates create "pseudo-events" or fictitious issues to differentiate themselves from other 
candidates). 
44. See S. LYDENBERG, supra note 41, at 57-58 (Oregon ballot measure committee formed 
at grassroots level to oppose efforts of corporate opponents; raised $3,000 for communication 
aimed at passing ballot measure; measure passed in face of spending by corporate opponents 
of close to $300,000); Lutrin & Settle, supra note 41, at 370 (coalition of citizen groups conduct 
statewide campaign for California Coastal Conservation ballot measure, making use of ser-
vices donated by well-known cartoonist and professional photographers; suit filed with Fed-
eral Communications Commission under fairness doctrine resulting in free equal media time. 
45. See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968). ("Competition in ideas and gov-
ernmental policies is at the core of our electoral process and of the First Amendment free-
doms."); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563,573 (1968) ("The public interest in having 
free and unhindered debate on matters of public importance [is] the core value of the Free 
Speech Clause of the First Amendment .... "). 
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hood that ballot measure contributions represent the contributor's 
speech, rather than a general expression of loyalty or an attempt to 
gain influence, distinguish them from candidate contributions. 
Third, the Buckley Court's observation that the "transformation 
of [candidate] contributions into political debate involves speech by 
someone other than the contributor"46 applies with less force to bal-
lot measure contributions. No candidate controls the "transforma-
tion" of such contributions into speech. A ballot measure committee 
is merely a conduit that aggregates and channels contributions into 
political communication.47 It is true, however, that a ballot measure 
committee's message can never perfectly mirror the views of all con-
tributors. The force of this "congruence argument"48 depends upon 
the extent to which incongruent speech is constitutionally protected. 
A transformation that may constitutionally justify limitations takes 
place between contribution and communication even in ballot meas-
ure contests.49 
46. 424 U.S. at 21. 
47. This aggregation and channeling function allows the average individual, through con-
tributions to ballot measure committees, to communicate with the same efficacy as individuals 
with greater resources who communicate through direct spending. See Baker, Scope of the 
First Amendment Freedom of Speech, in CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA 81 (R. 
Collins ed. 1980). ("In essence an association is merely an assembly displaced over time and 
space .... [T]he group [can do] things beyond merely reasoning together. People come to-
gether in assemblies or associations in order to pursue or fulfill their goals."). 
48. "Congruence" is defined as "the quality or state of agreeing or coinciding." WEB-
STER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 236 (1978). The Buckley Court reasoned that the inter-
position of the candidate between the contributor and the communication produced by the 
contribution amounted to such a "transformation" that the specific dollar amount of the con-
tribution was not central to the first amendment interests involved in making a contribution. 
See text at notes 22-33 supra. This Note analyzes the extent to which there is agreement or 
coincidence between the contributor's outlook on a ballot measure question and the message 
conveyed by the ballot measure committee and concludes that there is at least as much congru-
ence in making a contribution to a ballot measure committee as there is in making a direct 
expenditure in the candidate election context. 
This conclusion is based on the plausible assumption that contributors will not contribute 
to ballot measure committees unless the committee's message is consistent with their viewpoint 
on ballot measure issues. Congruence is, of course, a question of degree - the size of a contri-
bution to a ballot measure committee, for example, reveals neither the intensity of the contrib-
utor's viewpoint nor the basis of the individual contributor's position. This Note argues, 
however, that the fact that neither the act of contributing nor the size of the contribution 
conveys such information does not render the spending any less protected under the first 
amendment than other forms of protected political expression. The ultimate message of any 
ballot measure committee - ''vote yes" or ''vote no" on a specific ballot measure - is so 
closely tied to the contributor's viewpoint that ballot measure contributions should enjoy full 
first amendment protection. 
49. One could argue that as much transformation takes place in the ballot measure context 
as in the candidate context. Just as all ballot measure contributors stand together with their 
committees for or against a ballot measure, candidate contributors arguably intend to convey 
the same "ultimate message" as candidates: "candidate X should be elected to office rather 
than candidate Y." But this does not weaken the case for protecting ballot measure contribu-
tions, rather, it calls into question the Buckley Court's analysis of candidate limitations. See 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 244 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(arguing that distinction between contributions and expenditures is a ''word game"). 
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Aggregating funds to communicate through a ballot measure 
committee interposes a step that would not be present if an individ-
ual directly spent the same amount of money on political communi-
cation. Practically, however, the transformation between ballot 
measure contributions and communication is similar to the transfor-
mation between direct expenditures and speech. so Direct spenders 
demand the most effective communication for their dollar.51 They 
thus retain political consultants, media experts, and large staffs to 
"package" and "deliver" their messsages as persuasively as possi-
ble. 52 Yet a "transformation" necessarily accompanies the use of 
such services. The message inevitably differs because the individual, 
seeking to communicate effectively, relies on more than a soapbox, a 
street comer, and his unampli:fied voice. 
Despite this incongruence, Buckley recognized a first amendment 
right to use advanced communication technology in candidate elec-
tions, precisely because of its effectiveness.53 Ballot measure com-
mittees afford individuals the same opportunity to communicate 
effectively on referendum issues. Only by contributing to a ballot 
measure committee can average individuals use these media to ex-
press their views.54 A ballot measure contributor's interest is in this 
50. A comparison with candidate contributions illustrates this point. If a candidate con-
tributor makes a contribution that the candidate uses to defray nonspeech related expenses, the 
first amendment does not protect every dollar of the contribution because it has resulted in no 
speech at all. See text at notes 22-33 supra. But if the candidate uses the contribution to rent a 
hall equipped with loudspeakers, the contribution results in speech. The speech, however, is 
the candidate's and not the contributor's - the contributor thus has no fundamental free 
speech interest in making unlimited contributions. If, on the other hand, the contributor and 
candidate shared viewpoints, and the candidate used the contribution for political expression, 
the first amendment would afford its greatest protection. Although unrealistic in the federal 
candidate context, the contribution in this example is analogous to activities such as lobbying 
and legal representation - activities that the Supreme Court has held enjoy full first amend-
ment protection. See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 
U.S. 127 (1967) (lobbying); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (litigation). 
Candidate contributions will almost always fall into the first two categories. Like direct 
expenditures, ballot measure contributions, however, will almost always be analogous to lob-
bying and litigation. 
51. There is no dearth of literature on how to spend money most effectively for political 
communication. See, e.g., A. STEINBERG, THE POLITICAL CAMPAIGN HANDBOOK (1976); THE 
POLITICAL MARKETPLACE (D. Rosenbloom ed. 1972) (see especially part VII, ''The Profes-
sional Campaign Managers," an alphabetical index of all campaign management firms), See 
generally THE NEW STYLE IN ELECTION CAMPAIGNS (2d ed. R. Argranoff ed. 1976). 
52. Ironically, the sophisticated "packaging" and "delivery" of political communication 
might have begun in California with Whitaker and Baxter, a firm that rose to prominence 
through its successful management of referendum campaigns. See REFERENDUMS, supra note 
2, at 106-07. 
53. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I, 19 (1976) (per curiam). 
54. The CARC Court noted that although the limitation prohibited contributions of more 
than a modest size "an individual or business entity . . . remains free to spend money in 
unlimited amounts, by mass advertising or any other method, to inform the public of its rea-
sons why the measure should be adopted or defeated." 27 Cal. 3d at 829, 614 P.2d at 748, 167 
Cal. Rptr. at 90 (emphasis original). But what is the average individual likely to be able lo 
secure for his or her direct expenditure dollar? Although it is not clear how much money the 
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respect equivalent to the interest that Buckley found sufficient to in-
validate direct spending limitations. Divergence of group expression 
from the views of individual members remains a possibility, but this 
does not justify equating ballot measure contributions, which are 
possibly divergent, with candidate contributions, which are almost 
"average individual" spends annually on political communication, see Adamany, supra note 
24, at 17-28 (few citizens regularly contribute to political parties), it is possible to hazard a 
guess at what an "effective" media campaign for or against the ballot measure at issue in 
CARC would cost an individual were he to spend directly: 
TELEVISION COVERAGE 
1. KBHK TV (Field Communications Affiliate) 
l. most expensive periods ............................•..•..•. 
2. before/qfter most expensive periods ......................•.. 
3. least expensive periods ..........•..•..•................... 
2. KDTV (Spanish speaking, SIN Affiliate) 
l. most expensive periods ............•.•.....•..•.....•..•..• 
$1,312.00 (mean) 
$ 525.00 (mean) 
$ 195.00 (mean) 
$ 200.00-
$ 120.00 (range) 
2. befare/qfter most expensive periods . . . . . . . • . • . . . . . • . . • • . . . • . $ 85.00 (mean) 
3. least expensive periods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . • . . . . . • . . • . . • $ 40.00 (mean) 
[figures are for 30 seconds of broadcast time, mean(s) derived from figures for specific time 
periods within general time period indicated.] 
SPOT TELEVISION RATES AND DATA, May 15, 1980, at 59. 
NEWSPAPER COVERAGE 
1. SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER & CHRONICLE (black & white) 
l. 1/4 page ad, l day 
a. Examiner •.•....•..........................•..••.••.• 
b. Chronicle .•......•.....................•.•..••.•...• 
c. Examiner & Chronicle .........•..•........•..•....... 
2. 1/8 page ad, l day 
a. Examiner ........•..•.•..•.•..•..•.••....•..•........ 
b. Chronicle .................•.....•..•.•..•..•...•.•.. 







[The Chronicle is the evening newspaper, circulation 504,644 (excluding Sunday). The Exam-
iner is the morning newspaper, circulation 157,709 (excluding Sunday). NEWSPAPER RATES 
AND DATA, May 12, 1980, at 214-16.] Cost figures from Revised National Rate Card No. 14, 
San Francisco Chronicle and Examiner, Jan. I, 1981 (on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
2. INDEPENDENT GAZETTE (Berkeley/Richmond area) (black & white) (daily rate) 
l. full page ad . • . • . • • . • . • . . • . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . $1,620.00 
2. 1/4 page ad . . • . • . • . . . . • . • • . . . . . . • . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 405.00 
[Circulation of 50,500 (excluding Sunday).] Cost figures from Independent & Gazette Retail 
Advertising Rates, Jan. I, 1981 (on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
3. WALL STREET JOURNAL (Western Edition) (black & white) (daily rate) 
l. 1/8 page ad • . • . . . . . • • . • . • • . • . • • . • . . • . • • . • . . • • . • . . . . . . . . . $1,265.40 
2. 1/6 page ad • . • . • . • . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • • • . • • . • . . • . . • . . . • . • $1,687.20 
3. 1/4 page ad . . • . • . . • . . . . . . • . • . . • . • . . • • . • . . • . • . . • • . . . . . . . . $2,530.80 
[Circulation of approximately 320,000.] Cost figures from Wall Street Journal Western Edi-
tion Advertising Rate Sheet, Jan. I, 1981 (on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
The above figures do not include preparation or production costs, or the costs associated 
with professional political consulting and media planning. Accordingly, these figures are only 
illustrative of what a direct expenditure ballot measure campaign effort would cost a private 
individuaL Nevertheless, the magnitude of the figures suggests that the CARC court was mis-
guided in concluding that because the limitations applied only to contributions, they would not 
significantly infringe on expression. 
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necessarily so. 55 
Finally, ballot measure contribution limitations undercut basic 
associational rights, for the same reason that direct expenditure ceil-
ings undercut such rights. Such limitations prevent individuals from 
effectively amplifying their political communication.56 Buckley does 
not demand a different result. Underlying the Court's conclusion 
that candidate limitations only marginally restrict a contributor's 
freedom of association was its finding that such contributions gener-
55. The contrary argument was asserted and rejected in First Natl. Bank v. Bellotti, 435 
U.S. 765, 792-93, 794 n.34 (1978). The Court acknowledged that the political views of some 
shareholders were likely to be at odds with corporate political co=unication regarding a 
ballot measure, but concluded that this did not justify lesser first amendment protection for 
such co=unication. 
In other contexts the Court has rejected similar arguments. See United Mine Workers, 
Dist. 12 v. Illinois State Bar Assn., 389 U.S. 217, 223 (1967) (rejecting argument that full-time 
attorney retained by Union was likely to compromise members' interests out of loyalty to 
Union; possibility "purely theoretical"). As a general matter, the Court has assumed that 
groups or associations can engage in activity protected under the first amendment on behalf of 
their members because the interest of the group is identical with that of its members. See, e.g. , 
Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961) (group 
can lobby Congress to further members' political and economic interests); NAACP v. 
Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (groups can pursue constitutional rights of 
members through litigation). In Buckley the Court reaffirmed the principle that an interfer-
ence with group activity is "simultaneously an interference with the freedom of the mem-
ber[s]." 424 U.S. at 22 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (plurality 
opinion)). 
Indeed, it has been noted that divergence between individual political views and the polit-
ical co=unication of groups to which individuals belong is in fact desirable because it pro-
motes the interchange of ideas, and thereby facilitates the process of consensus formation in 
society. See R. MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES -A SOCIETAL STUDY OF THE OLIGARCHICAL 
TENDENCIES OF MODERN DEMOCRACY 36 (1962) ("In essence, democracy in modern society 
may be viewed as involving the conflict of organized groups competing for support. . • . This 
image of democracy as conflicts of organized groups ... may be far from the ideal of the 
Greek city state or of small Swiss cantons, but in operation as a system it is far better than any 
other political system which has been devised."); D. TRUMAN, supra note 24, at 508-09. 
Like the larger political system within which they operate, groups formed for the purpose 
of political expression and advocacy must acco=odate the differing views of their member-
ship. See J. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM & DEMOCRACY 269 (1947) (one advantage 
of the democratic form of government is formation of "elite groups," or decision-making cen-
ters, with only episodic participation of voters). See generally Chapman, Voluntary Association 
and the Political Theory of Pluralism, in VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS, supra note 37, at 114: 
In one way or another, every political theory faces the various implications of the 
distinction and divergence between collective and individual rationality; each attempts to 
prescribe and to institutionalize against them. All the dimensions of pluralist politics ex-
hibit a co=on shape and rhythm. For these massive regularities, the political theory of 
pluralism offers an abstract and general explanation in the permanent and contrasting 
facets of human rationality. 
See also, McBride, Voluntary Association: Tlze Basis of an Ideal Model and the ''Demo-
cratic" Failure, in VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS, supra note 37, at 202, 229-30 (arguing that 
membership in voluntary associations increases individual responsibility and participation in 
social change). 
56. An individual's right to spend directly for political co=unication is not less protected 
when exercised in concert with others who have similar views. See NAACP v. Alabama ex 
rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 459 (1958) (I'he association "is the appropriate party to assert 
these rights, because it and its members are in every practical sense identical. The Association 
. . . is but the medium through which its individual members seek to make more effective the 
expression of their own views."); note 37 supra. 
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ally are "undifferentiated, symbolic act[s]."57 Ballot measure contri-
butions, however, are neither "symbolic" nor "undifferentiated.': 
Unlike candidate contributors, supporters of ballot measure commit-
tees seek to secure effective advocacy of a particular policy. Limita-
tions on their contributions should, therefore, be "subject to the 
closest scrutiny.''ss 
Close scrutiny will reveal that ballot measure limitations create 
more than a "merely theoretical" threat to a contributor's right to 
amplify his political views. CARC, for example, upheld a $250 limi-
tation. This will prevent individuals with moderate incomes from 
securing the fullest possible access to the indispensable "expensive 
modes of communication.''59 The California court concluded that 
because only seventeen percent of the total value of contributions 
exceeded $250, the limitation was not unduly burdensome.60 But the 
court ignored the value of additional contributions that individuals 
might have made had there been no limitation. Instead of trying to 
find a level of limitation that would not infringe on contributors' 
rights, the CARC court should have followed Buckley's explicit re-
fusal to defer to legislative assessments of what constitutes a "fair" or 
"reasonable" political fight.61 The courts can ensure effective polit-
ical advocacy only by letting individuals set their own upper limits 
on contributions. 62 
In four important respects, ballot measure contributions are both 
distinguishable from candidate contributions and comparable to di-
rect expenditures. Ballot measure limitations reduce the quantity of 
political expression and the ability of individuals to associate for the 
advancement of common political beliefs. The constitutionality of 
ballot measure limitations thus "turns on whether the governmental 
interests advanced in [their] support satisfy the exacting scrutiny ap-
plicable to limitations on core First Amendment rights of political 
expression."63 Part II considers those governmental interests, and 
57. 424 U.S. at 21. 
58. 424 U.S. at 25. 
59. See notes 20 & 54supra. 
60. 27 Cal. 3d at 830, 614 P.2d at 748, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 90. 
61. The Buckley Court stated: "In the free society ordained by our Constitution it is not 
the government, but the people - individually as citiz.ens and candidates and collectively as 
associations and political committees - who must retain control over the quantity and range 
of debate .... " 424 U.S. at 57. 
62. The state's decision to limit contributions to a certain dollar amount will inevitably be 
arbitrary because not all individuals will be able to use their resources in an equally effective 
manner. 
63. 424 U.S. at 44-45. It is important to note that the Buckley Court did not conclude that 
candidate contributions deserved no first amendment protection. Rather, the Court found that 
"although the Act's contribution and expenditure limitations both implicate fundamental First 
Amendment interests, its expenditure ceilings impose significantly more severe restrictions on 
protected freedoms of political expression and association than do its limitations on financial 
contributions." 424 U.S. at 23 (emphasis added). The Court upheld the contribution limita-
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concludes that they either are not furthered by ballot measure limita-
tions or could be furthered by less restrictive means. 
II. THE STATE INTERESTS 
Because ballot measure limitations restrict first amendment 
rights, Buckley makes clear that they must withstand "exacting scru-
tiny." A state or local government may restrict ballot measure con-
tributions only if it "demonstrates a sufficiently important interest 
and employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment" 
of first amendment freedoms.64 Courts have not agreed whether bal-
lot measure limitations actually further such a compelling65 state in-
terest.66 
Buckley sustained the FECA's candidate limitations solely be-
cause of the governmental interest in preventing quid pro quo cor-
ruption between contributors and candidates. 67 This concern does 
not justify ballot measure limitations. Ballot measure contests do 
not involve candidates for public office, and ballot measure contribu-
tions do not create political debts of the kind contemplated in Buck-
ley. 68 Large contributions to ballot measure committees influence 
only the voters, and only "in a manner protected by the first amend-
ment."69 Because ballot measure limitations are not necessary to 
prevent quid pro quo corruption, courts must find other compelling 
governmental interests. 
The CARC court found compelling Berkeley's interest in pre-
serving the integrity of the referendum process.70 Although the 
opinion lacks clarity, it does suggest three more specific governmen-
tal interests: lessening abuse of the ballot measure process by narrow 
interest groups, reducing apathy, and equalizing political expression. 
tions because it found that they served a compelling governmental interest. To the extent that 
ballot measure limitations serve no such governmental interest, see Part II infra, Buckley's 
distinction between direct expenditure and candidate contributions becomes fess important. 
Part rs equation of ballot measure and direct expenditure limitations, however, remains criti-
cal because it indicates the severity of the restriction of first amendment rights against which 
asserted governmental interests must be balanced. 
64. 424 U.S. at 25. 
65. The Supreme Court has "employed a variety of descriptive terms: compelling; sub-
stantial; subordinating; paramount; cogent; strong." United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 
376-77 (1968) (footnotes omitted). 
66. See note 3 supra. 
67. 424 U.S. at 26-29. See Let's Help Florida v. McCrary, 621 F.2d 195, 199 (5th Cir. 
1980), appeal filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3625 (U.S. Dec. 12, 1980) (No. 80-970). 
68. First Natl. Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790 (1978); Let's Help Florida v. McCrary, 
621 F.2d 195, 199-200, appeal filed, 49 U.S.L.W. 3625 (U.S. Dec. 12, 1980) (No. 80-970). 
69. Let's Help Florida v. McCrary, 621 F.2d 195, 200 (5th Cir. 1980), appeal filed, 49 
U.S.L.W. 3625 (U.S. Dec. 12, 1980) (No. 80-970). 
70. 27 Cal. 3d at 829, 614 P.2d at 748, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 90. 
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Part II considers these asserted interests and demonstrates that they 
cannot justify ballot measure limitations. 
A. Narrow Interests 
The CARC court initially observed that large contributors could 
dominate the ballot measure process by overpowering the efforts of 
other citizens to disseminate opinions. 71 Because such domination 
could transform ballot measures into a "tool of narrow interests,"72 
the court concluded that candidate contributions and contributions 
to ballot measure committees differed very little in their effect upon 
the election process.73 According to the court, contribution limita-
tions would combat this problem by preventing large contributors 
from leaving other citizens with a "stilled voice,"74 and by restoring 
the power ofreason.75 The court also implied that the ineffectiveness 
of disclosure regulations in overcoming narrow interest domination 
justified contribution limitations.76 
I. Lessening .Domination by Narrow Interests 
The problem of narrow interest domination of the political pro-
cess has troubled many commentators. 77 The "narrow interests" 
71. 27 Cal. 3d at 826-27, 614 P.2d at 746, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 88. 
72. 27 Cal. 3d at 827, 614 P.2d at 746, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 88. 
73. 27 Cal. 3d at 826, 614 P.2d at 746, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 88. 
74. 27 Cal. 3d at 827, 614 P.2d at 746, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 88. 
75. 27 Cal. 3d at 827, 614 P.2d at 746, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 88. 
76. 27 Cal. 3d at 831, 614 P.2d at 749, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 91. 
77. The initiative and referendum were originally established in an attempt to limit the 
influence of corporations and other "special interest groups" on the legislative process. See 
note 79 i'!fra. Those who inveigh against the domination of the electoral process by narrow 
interests argue that these interests make disproportionate use of the media to sway voter opin-
ion. See Mastro, Costlow & Sanchez, Taking the Initiative: Corporate Control ef the Referen-
dum Process Through Media Spending and What to IJoAbout It, 32 FED. COM. L.J. 315, 319-20 
(1980): 
A core value in American Society is that the democratic process works best when the 
electorate is well-informed. Therefore the public deserves to have a fair exchange of ideas 
and opinions. If one side can dominate any forum of ideas and opinions to the extent that 
only its viewpoint is heard, the electorate is ill-equipped to make wise decisions on issues 
of public importance. To editorialize their views and to influence the electorate, advo-
cates usually rely on mass media advertising which regularly reaches large audiences. But 
mass media advertising, especially on television, is so expensive that only well-financed 
organizations, whether corporations or citizens groups, can afford to pay. 
Id (footnotes omitted). 
Other observers have noted the tension between a commitment to both free political ex-
pression and a predominantly laissez-faire economic system: 
[F]irst amendment freedoms of speech, assembly, and association protect political activity. 
The ordinary exercise of these rights creates only marginal inequalities in political influ-
ence. Because financial participation is expandable, however, it produces inequalities that 
can be very high and that cannot be ameliorated by real choices open to the citizenry at 
large .... An ordinary citizen struggles to find the means to contribute $100. Money's 
extreme potential for multiple voting points to an important issue of political finance pol-
icy in a democracy: preventing gross inequalities in the meaning of the vote. 
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whose domination the CARC court feared could include both con-
tributors with "impure" motives and groups with a "disproportion-
ate" impact on the ballot measure process. The Supreme Court, 
however, has never recognized a compelling interest that justifies re-
stricting the first amendment rights of these individuals or groups. 
In fact, the Court has repeatedly emphasized that a speaker's first 
amendment protection does not decrease because he is motivated by 
narrow self-interest, whether economic or otherwise apolitical.78 It 
has also underscored the right of groups to pursue their self-interest 
through political expression, even though their impact may be re-
garded by some as disproportionate.79 
The CARC court, however, ignored this teaching because of its 
concern that the ballot measure process adopted by Californians to 
retain control over the legislature80 would somehow be tainted by 
Adamany, PAC'S and the .Democratic Financing of Politics, 22 Aruz. L. REV. 569, 571 (1980) 
(footnotes omitted). 
78. The Court has stated that restricting speech because of the interests of the speaker 
"amounts to an impermissible legislative prohibition of speech based on the identity of the 
interests that spokesmen may represent in public debate over controversial issues and a re-
quirement that the speaker have a sufficiently great interest in the subject to justify communi-
cation." First Natl. Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978). In deciding that commercial 
speech deserved first amendment protection because of society's strong interest in the free flow 
of co=ercial information, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that speech was unpro-
tected because it is "carried in a form that is 'sold' for profit." Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy 
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 761 (1976). The Court noted that: 
Obviously, not all co=ercial messages contain the same or even a very great public 
interest element. There are few to which such an element, however, could not be added. 
Our pharmacist, for example, could cast himself as a commentator on store-to-store dis-
parities in drug prices . . . . We sec little point in requiring him to do so, and little 
difference if he does not. 
425 U.S. at 764-65 (1976). 
79. The Court stressed this principle in Bellotti when it stated that: 
To be sure, corporate advertising may influence the outcome of the vote; this would be its 
purpose. But the fact that advocacy may persuade the electorate is hardly a reason to 
suppress it: The Constitution "protects expression which is eloquent no less than that 
wliich is unconvincing." 
435 U.S. at 790 (quoting Kinglsey Intl. Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 689 (1959)). 
80. Ballot measure enabling legislation is largely a product of the "progressive era" of the 
early twentieth century. See generally R. HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM (1955); c. Lon-
INGIER, THE PEOPLE'S LAW (1909); REFERENDUMS, supra note 2, at 1-37; L. TALLIAN, DIRECT 
DEMOCRACY (1977). 
The progressive movement sought to limit the influence of wealth, special interest groups, 
and corporations in the political process. The ballot measure mechanism was one of a host of 
reforms aimed at this end: 
[The] central programmatic thrust was for a number of reforms in the nation's and state's 
law-making machinery, all intended to increase ordinary citizens' participation in and 
power over governmental decisions. The main Progressive reforms included the Austra-
lian (secret) ballot; nonpartisan elections, especially at the local level; legal regulation of 
the organization, membership requirements, finance, and campaign activities of political 
parties; the direct primary; the recall of elected officials; and the initiative and referen-
dum. 
REFERENDUMS, supra note 2, at 27. 
For the view that the ballot measure process has in many respects succeeded as an alterna-
tive to the representative (!.e. , legislative) political process, see Bone & Benedict, Perspectives 
on .Direct Legislation: Washington State's Experience 1914-1973, 28 W. POL. Q. 330, 349 (1975) 
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the participation of "narrow interests." This argument merely as-
sumed its conclusion that the state may limit the ability on "narrow" 
interest groups to express their positions on public issues. This con-
clusion is untenable because the Supreme Court has held that weak-
ening the power of "special interests" cannot justify limitations on 
first amendment rights. 81 
2. Promoting the "Power of Reason" 
The CARC court also found compelling Berkeley's interest in 
promoting the "power of reason." California enacted its ballot 
measure provisions to enable the electorate to govern directly by ma-
jority rule, but large contributions threatened to transform this "vi-
sion of direct democracy" into a "tool of narrow interests."82 
According to the court, "[w]hen large contributors use the power of 
("[T]he direct legislation process does continue to be a vital part of the state's political system 
and culture. Some of the State's most exciting political battles are centered around proposi-
tions .... The process ... has helped to educate the citizenry on many public problems."); 
Price, The Initiative: A Comparative Stale Analysis and Reassessment of a Western Phenome-
non, 28 W. PoL. Q. 243, 261-62 (1975) ("The initiative does provide a last resort to the public 
to bypass a recalcitrant legislature and or governor . . . . Clearly, initiatives do allow for 
decisive decisions on particularly sensitive, hard to resolve, issues."). 
81. The argument that the state can control debate on issues of public importance by im-
posing restrictions on expression based on either the identity or the interests of the speaker was 
most recently and resoundingly rejected in First Natl. Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
Bello/Ii involved legislation forbidding corporate expenditures for political communication re-
lating to ballot measure issues not materially affecting the corporation's business interests. 435 
U.S. at 768. In striking down the statute, the Court stated: 
In the realm of protected speech, the legislature is constitutionally disqualified from 
dictating the subjects about which persons may speak and the speakers who may address a 
public issue .... If a legislature may direct business corporations to "stick to business," 
it also may limit other corporations - religious, charitable, or civic - to their respective 
business when addressing the public. Such power in government to channel the expres-
sion of views is unacceptable under the First Amendment. Especially where . . . the leg-
islature's suppression of speech suggests an attempt to give one side of a debatable public 
question an advantage in expressing its views to the people, the First Amendment is 
plainly offended. 
435 U.S. at 784-86 (footnotes and citations omitted). 
The CARC court did not offer any definition of what constitutes a "narrow interest." If the 
CARC court conceived a "narrow interest" to be a particular point of view it was clearly 
wrong in holding that such points of view can be constitutionally cordoned out of the arena of 
public debate. See, e.g., Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972) (''To permit the 
continued building of our politics and culture, and to assure self-fulfillment for each individ-
ual, our people are guaranteed the right to express any thought, free from government censor-
ship. The essence of this forbidden censorship is content control."). Alternatively, if the 
CARC court viewed well-heeled, financially powerful speakers as narrow interests, its holding 
is equally erroneous. In rejecting the argument that the state could restrict the expression of 
corporations with respect to ballot measure questions because corporations were wealthy and 
capable of dominating debate, the court stated: ''The potential impact of this argument ... is 
unsettling. . . . Except in the special context of limited access to the channels of communica-
tion ... this concept contradicts basic tenets of First Amendment jurisprudence." First Natl. 
Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 791 n.30 (citations omitted). See Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elec-
tions, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966) ("Wealth, like race, creed, or color, is not germane to one's 
ability to participate in the electoral process."). 
82. 27 Cal. 3d at 827, 614 P.2d at 746, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 88. 
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their purse to overcome the power of reason, they thwart the in-
tended purpose" of ballot measures. 83 Contribution limitations, the 
court implied, were necessary to promote rational political dialogue. 
This justification, however, conflicts with first amendment doctrine, 
which bars governmental interference with expression precisely be-
cause no single "voice of reason" appeals to all individuals. 84 
Even if a single "voice of reason" represented the entire public 
interest, and ballot measure committees expressed only "unreasona-
ble" positions, contribution limitations would nevertheless be objec-
tionably paternalistic. The CARC court assumed that voters respond 
to the volume or quantity of political communication rather than to 
its merit. The court's implicit premise was that the slanted propa-
ganda of free spending interest groups, if unchecked, would confuse 
voters into making unwise decisions. 85 These assumptions evince a 
paternalism that the Supreme Court has rejected.86 In recent com-
83. 27 Cal. 3d at 827, 614 P.2d at 746, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 88. 
84. Madison himself appreciated this fact. During the time Madison was working on Fed-
eralist Paper # 10, he stated in a letter to Thomas Jefferson that: 
Those who contend for a simple Democracy, or a pure republic . . . assume or suppose a 
case which is altogether fictitious. They found their reasoning on the idea, that the people 
composing the Society, enjoy not only an equality of political rights, but that they have all 
precisely the same interests, and the same feelings in every respect. ... We know how-
ever that no society ever did or can consist of so homogenous a mass of Citizens. . . . In 
all civilized societies, distinctions are various and unavoidable. . . . In addition to • . . 
natural distinctions, artificial ones will be founded, on accidental differences in political, 
religious, or other opinions. . . . However erroneous or ridiculous these grounds of dis-
sention and faction may appear to the enlightened Statesman or benevolent philosopher, 
the bulk of mankind who are neither Statesmen nor Philosophers, will continue to view 
them in a different light. 
5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 17, 28-29 (G. Hunt ed. 1904). 
The Supreme Court has also recognized that first amendment protection is essential be-
cause no single "voice of reason" leads inevitably to one conclusion on political issues. See, 
e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (''The Constitutional right of free expression 
is powerful medicine in a society as diverse and populous as ours. It is designed and intended 
to remove governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion, putting the decision as 
to what views shall be voiced largely into the hands of each ofus .... "); West Va. State Bd. 
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("If there is any fixed star in our constitutional 
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in poli• 
tics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion, or force citizens to confess by word or 
act their faith therein."). 
85. See 21 Cal. 3d at 839, 614 P.2d at 753, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 95 (Richardson, J., dissenting). 
The fear is unfounded because it appears that: 
California's well-educated voters seemed far more able to cope with intricate initiatives 
than had been presumed by political scientists. It may be that the surprising voting results 
on initiatives over the last several years is a temporary phenomenon, but for whatever the 
reasons, the easy assertions about the apathy, indifference, and susceptible nature of vot-
ers can at least be questioned by the California experience. 
Price, supra note 80, at 260-61 (footnotes omitted). See REFERENDUMS, supra note 2, at I 10-
14. "[V]oters who are reasonably alert may well be confronted with more information than 
they can absorb. . . . (A) large body of voters appears to know what it is doing." Id. at 112. 
86. See Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring): 
But it cannot be the duty, because it is not the right, of the state to protect the public 
against false doctrine. The very purpose of the First Amendment is to foreclose public 
authority from assuming a guardianship of the public mind through regulating the press, 
speech, and religion. In tliis field every person must be his own watchman for truth, 
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mercial speech cases, for example, the Court has assumed that 
information is not in itself harmful, that people will perceive their own 
best interests if only they are well enough informed, and that the best 
means to that end is to open the channels of communication rather 
than to close them. . . . 
But the choice is not ours to make. . . . 
It is precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of sup-
pressing information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely avail-
able, that the first amendment makes for us. 87 
According to the Court, the Constitution vests in the people, not in 
the legislatures or courts, the responsibility for judging and evaluat-
ing conflicting ideas. 88 · 
Berkeley presented no evidence that the electorate was incapable 
of performing its evaluative role. It is reasonable to assume that the 
average voter understands that self-interested groups sponsor and 
support ballot measures. 89 The first amendment contemplates that 
voters will consider the source and credibility of the advocate in 
evaluating the relative merits of conflicting arguments.90 But the 
conflicting arguments must be adequately presented to the voters. 
Because positions on ballot measure issues do not generally divide 
along party lines, political parties rarely contribute actively to ballot 
measure debate.91 Communication by ballot measure committees 
thus serves an important informational need, and contribution limi-
tations restrict expression that may be essential to informed decision 
making. 
3. Empirical Evidence of Domination 
The empirical evidence buttresses the conclusion that first 
amendment theory compels: lessening interest group domination is 
not a compelling justification for ballot measure limitations. Finan-
because the forefathers did not trust any government to separate the true from the false 
for us. 
Accord, Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940). See generally Note, Restrictions on 
Electric Utility Advertising, 78 MICH. L. REV. 433 (1980). 
87. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 
770 (1976). 
88. First Natl. Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791 (1978). 
89. 27 Cal. 3d at 838, 614 P.2d at 753, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 95 (Richardson, J., dissenting). 
90. 27 Cal. 3d at 840, 614 P.2d at 755, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 97 (Richardson, J., dissenting) 
(quoting First Natl. Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791-92 (1978)). See generally A. 
MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 34. 
91. Typically, there is an "absence of the party label on ballot measures and a general lack 
of party activity." REFERENDUMS, supra note 2, at 114. Another commentator has noted that 
although "parties can be extremely important in shaping opinion on the propositions, . . . this 
influence is limited (and made difficult to examine fully) by the fact that the parties take posi-
tions on only a few ballot measures. . . . They do not wish their position on the propositions 
to harm them in the partisan races - after all, every stand alienates somebody." Meuller, 
Voting on the Propositions: Ballot Patterns and Historical Trends in California, 63 AM. POL. 
Sc1. REV. ll97, 1206-07 (1969) (emphasis deleted). 
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cially powerful and well organized interests might "dominate" the 
ballot measure process, first, as the only groups that can afford to 
qualify ballot measures, and second, as the groups whose positions 
consistently prevail in elections. Both tests of domination reveal that 
control of the California ballot measure process has eluded the pow-
erful interests feared by the CARC court. 
First, powerful interests have no monopoly on qualifying ballot 
measures. Qualifying a ballot measure is difficult and expensive in 
California,92 but less affluent and poorly organized groups have 
placed a number of measures on the ballot.93 Ballot measure limita-
tions, moreover, do not enable poorly financed or understaffed 
groups to amass the 300,000 and 500,000 petition signatures required 
to qualify referendums and initiatives.94 In fact, contribution limita-
tions may make the qualification process more difficult for individu-
als with modest incomes by reducing their ability to cooperate with 
others.95 Thus limitations may increase "narrow interest" domina-
tion of the qualification process. 
The second test of control - successful advocacy of ballot meas-
ures - similarly refutes the domination hypothesis. "Narrow inter-
ests" have failed to thwart the will of the people in ballot measure 
contests. High powered groups have been notably unsuccessful ad-
vocates: 
What may one conclude about initiative campaigns? Certainly, they 
are risky investments ... Between 1964 and 1976 no major economic 
group was able to enact an initiative measure. Realtors and land de-
velopers, state employees, agri-business, farm labor, and greyhound 
racing interests all failed in their attempt to bypass the legislative pro-
cess. Instead, victories were achieved by groups with minimum eco-
nomic clout but with the ability to capitalize on high public interest in 
such contrasting issues as coastal conservation and the death penalty.96 
California's actual experience makes clear that the CARC court re-
lied more on suspicion than on hard evidence that spending has a 
controlling influence on ballot measure results or that limitations are 
necessary to prevent "narrow interest" domination.97 
92. See REFERENDUMS, supra note 2, at 101. 
93. Price, supra note 80, at 260. 
94. See REFERENDUMS, supra note 2, at 101. 
95. See note 54 supra. 
96. REFERENDUMS, supra note 2, at 106. See Meuller, supra note 91; Price, supra note 80, 
at 260. 
97. The CARC court's suspicion seems totally unfounded, given the demonstrable failure 
of major special interest groups in California to pass any initiative. Although it has been 
suggested that special interests, generally corporate interests, have been successful in b!ocki11g 
the passage of popular measures, see S. LYDENBERG, supra note 41, at 30-31 (corporate cam-
paign opposing anti-smoking measure employed fraudulent advertising), this generalization 
must be discounted in light of the fact that corporate opposition failed to block the passage of a 
major environment ballot measure in California. See Lutrin & Settle, supra note 41, at 369-71. 
In short, there is 
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4. Contribution Limitations as a Substitute for .Disclosure 
The CARC court feared that the anonymity surrounding ballot 
measure contributions would mislead citizens, and apparently con-
cluded that the ineffectiveness of disclosure laws justified limitations. 
According to the court, disclosure laws inadequately curtail the in-
fluence of "narrow interests" because campaign propaganda and the 
identification of contributors are not simultaneous; voters form im-
pressions on campaign issues before committees reveal their source 
of financing, and evaluation of contributor motives may thus come 
too late.98 Recent studies of candidate elections indicate that disclo-
sure legislation may not effectively correct this problem.99 Two fac-
tors indicate that the need for disclosure may be even greater in 
ballot measure elections. First, in ballot measure contests, the voters 
evaluate ideas rather than candidates. Second, ballot measure com-
mittees often receive contributions from large, out-of-state corpora-
tions, 100 whose motives will be of interest to local voters. 
The Supreme Court has recognized that disclosure serves a legiti-
mate state interest, 101 but it has never held that governments can im-
pose contribution limitations to complement or substitute for 
disclosure. Mandatory disclosure seeks to enrich political communi-
cation; ballot measure limitations merely restrict it. Contribution 
limitations improve or replace disclosure legislation only by sup-
pressing political expression to levels that make disclosure an aca-
demic issue. Even the impossibility of devising more effective 
disclosure laws, if proved, would not justify such a restriction of 
political expression. 
Berkeley, however, did not attempt to show that its disclosure 
laws are inadequate and cannot be improved. Berkeley requires bal-
lot measure committees to report the names of contributors, their 
no neat correlation . . . between campaign expenditures and campaign results. Even if 
superiority in expenditures and success at the polls always ran together, the flow of funds 
... might simpfy reflect ... prior popular appeal rather than create it. Our understand-
ing of voting behavior is not so precise that all the financial and non-financial factors that 
contribute to success can be sorted out with confidence. Yet it is clear that under some 
conditions the use of funds can be decisive. And under others, no amount of money spent 
. . . could alter the outcome . . . financial outlays cannot guarantee victory in elections. 
A. HEARD, supra note 28, at 16 (1960). 
98. 27 Cal. 3d at 831, 614 P.2d at 749, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 91. 
99. See Adamany, supra note 77, at 598: 
Disclosure laws generate more information than can be mastered by the media, the politi-
cians, or the voters - at least in the short run of a campaign. Media may show little 
interest in political financing practices, and their partisan or editorial positions may color 
their coverage of such practices by competing candidates. Voters, too, are likely to evalu-
ate such information through a "perceptual screen" that is colored by their own partisan 
allegiances and candidate preferences. 
100. See S. LYDENBERG, supra note 41,parsim; Mastro, Costlow & Sanchez, supra note 77. 
101. See, e.g., First Natl. Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792 n.32 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. l, 67 (1976). 
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addresses, and the amounts contributed. 102 The city then publishes 
this information in local newspapers prior to the election. 103 If the 
current laws are ineffective, Berkeley could require committees to 
make more extensive disclosures contemporaneously with their 
messages. More demanding disclosure regulations would infringe 
on political expression less than an absolute ban on contributions 
over a certain dollar amount. The city could also increase its use of 
voter information pamphlets.104 For many voters these pamphlets 
are a primary source of information on ballot measure issues, 105 and 
other states have used them successfully. These alternatives and 
others, all less restrictive of first amendment rights than contribution 
limitations, were not adequately explored by the CARC court. 
A reduction of "narrow interest" domination is unnecessary, vio-
lates the first amendment, and is attainable by less restrictive means. 
This asserted governmental interest, therefore, cannot justify ballot 
measure limitations. The next section considers whether a desire to 
reduce apathy can justify such limitations. 
B. Apathy 
Apathy is a vague concept, but the CARC court defined it as "in-
difference, unconcern, and lack ofparticipation,"106 and found com-
102. Berkeley, Cal., Election Reform Act of 1974, § 412(9) (Ord. No. 4700-N.S.) requires 
ballot measure committees to file in their campaign statement: 
The full name of each person from whom a contribution or contributions totalling fifty 
dollars ($50) or more has been received together with his or her street address, occupation, 
and the name of his or her employer, if any, or the principal place of business he or she is 
self-employed, the amount which he or she contributed, the date on which each contribu-
tion was received during the period covered by the campaign statement, and the cumula-
tive amount he or she contributed. 
103. Berkeley, Cal., Election Reform Act of 1974, § 112 (Ord. No. 4700-N.S.) provides: 
The City of Berkeley shall publish, in all newspapers whose editorial offices are in 
Berkeley, which during at least six (6) months of the year generally publish a newspaper 
at least five days a week and at least two-thirds of whose newspapers are delivered in 
Berkeley a list of all contributors of over $50 to all candidates or committees under the 
heading of Public Notice, at least two times in the seven days prior to the election. In 
addition, the City of Berkeley shall publish a list of all contributors of over $50 to all 
candidates or committees under the heading Public Notice, at such time or times and in 
such newspaper or newspapers as the Commission shall find is appropriate to inform 
minority group members of such contributions. In addition, the City of Berkeley may 
publish notices in such newspapers or other media as the Commission shall find is appro-
priate to inform the public. 
104. Berkeley mails a voter information pamphlet to all registered voters. The ballot 
measure election at issue in the CARC case was consolidated with the election for city council 
and school district members. The pamphlet ran 67 pages; less than two pages were devoted to 
analysis of the ballot measure. See City of Berkeley, California, Sample Ballot & Voter Infor-
mation Pamphlet, Consolidated General Municipal Election and Peralta Community College 
District 41-42 (1977) (on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
105. See REFERENDUMS, supra note 2, at 112 n.45. 
106. 27 Cal. 3d at 828, 614 P.2d at 747, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 89 (quoting Johnson v. Hamilton, 
15 Cal. 3d 461, 471, 541 P.2d 881, 886, 125 Cal. Rptr. 129, 134 (1975)), 
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pelling Berkeley's interest in reducing voter apathy. 107 The court's 
defense of ballot measure limitations premised that many individu-
als shun political activity because they feel dwarfed by the spending 
of others. 108 The CARC court assumed that it could constitutionally 
restrict the expression of some individuals to encourage the partici-
pation of others. A finding of apathy, however, would not justify 
restrictions on expression because a desire to reduce apathy assumes 
an optimal or minimally acceptable level of political debate and par-
ticipation. The first amendment prohibits precisely this sort of calcu-
lation.109 In rejecting the contention that spending in federal 
107. 27 Cal. 3d at 829, 614 P.2d at 748, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 90. 
108. 27 Cal. 3d at 828, 614 P.2d at 747, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 89 (quoting BERG, CORRUPTION 
IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM 47 (1976)) (" 'The mass of citizens have tended to shun 
the opportunity to donate to campaign coffers and to participate in other forms of political 
activity because they felt their limited resources would be outmatched by a small group of rich 
and influential "angels" .... ' "). 
109. The Buckley Court stated that "[t]he First Amendment denies government the power 
to determine that spending to promote one's political views is wasteful, excessive, or unwise." 
424 U.S. at 57. The state is forbidden to make this calculation because the first _amendment 
itself embodies the relevant decision: 
We have decided to be self-governed. We have measured the dangers and the values of 
the suppression of the freedom of public inquiry and debate. And, on the basis of that 
measurement, having regard for the public safety, we have decided that the destruction of 
freedom is always unwise, that freedom is always expedient. The conviction recorded by 
that decision is not a sentimental vagary about the "natural rights" of individuals. It is a 
reasoned and sober judgment as to the best available method of guarding the public 
safety. 
A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 34, at 57. 
Other commentators argue that although unfettered individual expression furthers society's 
long-run interest, individual expression would still merit protection even if this were not the 
case. See Baker, supra note 47, at 46: 
The liberty model holds that the free speech clause protects not a marketplace but 
rather an arena of individual liberty from certain types of governmental restrictions. 
Speech is protected not as a means to a collective good but because of the value of speech 
conduct to the individual. The liberty theory justifies protection because of the way the 
protected conduct fosters individual self-realization and self-determination without im-
properly interferring with the legitimate claims of others. 
Dworkin also argues that individual rights cannot be restricted merely because society finds 
the restriction expedient: 
The institution of rights against the government is not a gift of God, or an ancient ritual, 
or a national sport. It is a complex and troublesome practice that makes the Govern-
ment's job of securing the general benefit more difficult and more expensive. 
. . . It makes sense to say that a man has a fundamental right against the government, 
in the strong sense, like free speech, if that right is necessary to protect his dignity. . . . It 
does not make sense otherwise. 
R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 199 (1978). See also R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE 
AND UTOPIA 32-33 (1975) (emphasis original): 
But why may not one violate persons for the greater social good? Individually, we each 
sometimes choose to undergo some pain or sacrifice for a greater benefit or to avoid a 
greater harm .... Why not, similarly, hold that some persons have to bear some costs 
that benefit some other person more, for the sake of the overall social good? But there is 
no social entity with a good that undergoes some sacrifice for its own good. There are only 
individual people, with their own individual lives. Using one of these people for the bene-
fit of others, uses him and benefits the others. Nothing more. What happens is that some-
thing is done to him for the sake of others. Talk of an overall social good covers this 
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elections had grown excessively, Buckley reiterated a fundamental 
principle: 
In the free society ordained by our Constitution it is not the govern-
ment but the people - individually as citizens and candidates and col-
lectively as associations and political committees - who must retain 
control over the quantity and range of debate on public issues in a 
political campaign. no 
The CARC court also assumed the existence of a causal nexus 
between large ballot measure contributions and voter apathy in Cali-
fornia.111 Apathy is a complicated and poorly understood state of 
mind that reflects socioeconomic and demographic factors, individ-
ual responses to particular issues, and the socialization of the fam-
ily.112 Voter turnout, for example, has been explained by both 
up. . . . He does not get some overbalancing good from his sacrifice, and no one is enti-
tled to force this upon him - least of all a state or government that claims his allegiance. 
llO. 424 U.S. at 57. 
Ill. 27 Cal. 3d at 828, 614 P.2d at 747, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 89. The court relied on BERO, 
supra note 108, whose conclusions were not specifically addressed to the California ballot 
measure process. As the dissent observed: 
[T)his wholly untested political hypothesis is not based upon any record but rather upon 
the opinions and conclusions of "commentators on our political scene," "a political sc1en• 
tist," or a "student of the California initiative process.' 
. . . [T)hese opinions do not constitute the hard evidentiary support needed to 
demonstrate a state's present and compelling interest in the suppression of the multiple 
First Amendment rights of our California citizens. The existence of such a threat and its 
potential are wholly undocumented. 
27 Cal. 3d at 835, 614 P.2d at 751-52, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 93-94 (Richardson, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis original). 
The CARC court's reliance on Professor Berg's general commentary on corruption in the 
political system is instructive because it demonstrates the danger of relying on broad general-
izations and facile assertions in situations where individual political expression is at stake. 
Berg is in fact a staunch supporter of the ballot measure process, and his support for a pro-
posed national ballot measure process was based on his "systematic analysis of what has oc-
curred in California." Berg stated: ''The problem of money is a problem of politics. It is not 
unique to the initiative process. It affects other aspects of our society, I would argue, ad-
versely.'' But Berg stated that the 
fundamental strength of (the ballot measure process is that people) deal with issues. You 
debate issues. You debate them on their merits. You do not have to deal with the ques-
tion of image. You do not have to deal with the question of personality. People deal with 
these issues as they are. 
It seems to me that out of the debate that will occur over these kinds of issues people 
are going to be more informed. I do not think there is any question about that. I suspect 
that my own faith is based upon looking at the experience in the state of California and 
elsewhere. I would like to believe that the people will in most cases make the right judg-
ment. 
Voter Initiative Constitutional Amendment: Hearings on S.J. Res. 67 Before the Subcomm. on 
the Constitution of the Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 47, 49 (1977) (testi• 
mony of Professor Berg). 
112. The classic study of electoral behavior is A. CAMPBELL, THE AMERICAN VOTER 
(1960). Campbell believed that party identification was the principal factor in voting choice, 
and that coherent belief patterns, or ideologies, were largely absent in the mass electorate. See 
also Pomper, The Impact of The American Voter on Political Science, 93 PoL. Sci. Q. 617, 
621-25 (1978) (indexing research supporting or refuting propositions advanced in The Ameri-
can Voter). See generally w. CROTTY, POLITICAL REFORM AND THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENT 
46-57; Scammon, Electoral Participation, 371 ANNALS 59 (1967) (demonstrating that voter 
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sophisticated economic theory and the weather. 113 Large expendi-
tures may not in fact influence participation; if individuals decide for 
independent reasons not to participate, ballot measure limitations 
would represent a misguided attempt to encourage participation in 
the face of individual decisions not to exercise first amendment 
rights. 114 Because such limitations do not affect the size of direct 
expenditures, they represent a futile attempt as well. 
The evidence before the CARC court not only failed to establish 
the crucial causal link between large contributions and voter apathy, 
but also fell short of demonstrating that apathy was a problem in 
California. Instead of requiring Berkeley to submit evidence of apa-
thy and prove that ballot measure limitations in fact curtailed apa-
thy, 115 the Court based its findings on judicial notice and 
conjecture.116 Had the court looked to objective evidence, it would 
turnout is greater among the well educated, older, male, nonminority, higher income segments 
of the population); Verba, JJemocratic Participation, 373 ANNALS 53 (1967), and sources cited 
therein. 
113. Verba, supra note 112, at 63. 
Voter apathy has been attributed to the changing nature of society and individual feelings 
of powerlessness. J. LIVINGSTON & R. THOMPSON, THE CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED 298 (2d 
ed. 1966) (quoting D. RIESMAN & N. GLAZER, FACES IN THE CROWD 33 (1952)): 
In the traditional democratic model ... politics was viewed as the arena in which 
men could control their collective destinies. Politics was a means by which society could 
be continuously adapted to men's moral purposes and public goals. A paradox of recent 
society is that while politics increasingly affects men's lives as the boundaries of govern-
mental activity are expanded, the individual's feeling of control and competence and his 
sense of mastery over the future seem to have diminished. 
Other scholars make a convincing argument that state-imposed restrictions and failure to 
promote the franchise account for low voter turnout in the United States. See Zisner & Daw-
son, Encouraging Voter Participation, in POLITICAL FINANCE 221, 227 (H. Alexander ed. 1979). 
See generally W. CROTTY, supra note I 12, at 239-42 (comparing franchise restriction in 1860 
with franchise restriction in 1968 on state-by-state basis). 
I 14. The state probably cannot compel individuals to express political views. See Wooley 
v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (individual cannot be punished for covering state motto, 
"live free or die," stamped on license plate; the freedom "of thought protected by the First 
Amendment . . . includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking 
at all."); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (school children 
could not be compelled to salute the American flag). Though the practice would be contrary to 
historical tradition, there is no apparent constitutional objection to requiring individuals to 
register to vote and make an appearance at a polling place on election day. Compulsory regis-
tration would no more intrude upon individual liberty than compulsory draft registration or 
other regulations that the state imposes. Other democracies require minimal political partici-
pation from their citizens. See K. PHILLIPS & P. BLACKMAN, ELECTORAL REFORM AND 
VOTER PARTICIPATION 23-34, 98-99 (comparing electoral laws of various countries and voter 
turnout). Read narrowly, Wooley and Barne/le may only preclude the state from requiring 
citizens to espouse official messages or ideologies. The state could avoid these difficulties by 
providing a "no preference" option for the individual. 
115. See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 362 (1976) ("burden is on the government to 
show the existence" of a compelling interest). See note 9 supra. 
I 16. 27 Cal. 3d at 828, 614 P.2d at 747, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 89. Berkeley argued that the 
ballot measure committee "did not show as a matter of law . . • that a $250.00 contribution 
limitation in a small local election failed to comply with the . . . concerns analyzed by the 
Buckley court." Brief for App., supra note 5, at 8. Berkeley was mistaken on the burden of 
proof question. See note 116 supra. The City argued that "[t]he contribution limitation at 
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have concluded that Californians are not apathetic about ballot 
measures. 
Citizen apathy toward ballot measures could manifest itself in 
three ways. First, one could inf er indifference toward ballot meas-
ures if citizens considered few and only a narrow range of ballot 
measure issues. Between 1960 and 1976, however, Californians used 
the ballot measure process twenty-six times. 117 They have consid-
ered issues as diverse as decriminalization of marijuana and rein-
statement of the death penalty; they have voiced opinions on pay 
television, greyhound racing and school busing; they have limited 
property taxes and defeated anti-homosexual and anti-smoking 
measures.118 Poorly organized groups lacking financial clout quali-
fied many of these measures.119 Second, individuals might sense the 
futility of their participation, and fail to communicate unpopular po-
sitions or oppose "narrow interests" during ballot measure cam-
paigns. But Californians have formed committees to take unpopular 
positions and to fight powerful interest groups. The CARC for ex-
ample, opposed a rent-control measure that was probably popular in 
a university community such as Berkeley. 120 At the statewide level, 
smaller interest groups have formed ballot measure coalitions and 
effectively used free media time under the FCC fairness doctrine. 121 
Third, citizens might fail to vote on ballot measure issues. In all but 
four of the twenty-six ballot measure elections between 1960 and 
1976, however, over 90% of those voting in the general elections also 
voted on the ballot measure issue. 122 Controversial issues drew a 
higher percentage.123 
Ballot measure limitations are invalid unless the "record or legis-
lative findings" demonstrate that large ballot measure contributions 
issue is supported by a legitimate governmental interest," Brief for Apps., supra note 5, at 6, 
but it did not submit evidence that the limitation would in fact curtail apathy. 
117. See REFERENDUMS, supra note 2, at 95. 
118. Id. at 94-95. 
119. See text at note 93 supra. 
120. Berkeley voters eventually passed a ballot measure establishing a Rent Stabilization 
Board empowered to fix rental rates on all real property within the city. Berkeley Election 
Statistics, Rent Stabilization and Eviction for Good Cause Program (election of June 3, 1980) 
(on file with the Michigan Law Review). 
121. See Lutrin & Settle, supra note 41, at 370. But see Mastro, Costlow & Sanchez, supra 
note 77, at 327-33 (arguing that "gross imbalances" in the coverage of issues resulted despite 
the use of free media time by citizen groups under the FCC fairness doctrine). 
122. REFERENDUMS, supra note 2, at 94. 
123. Id. at 108: "In general, the vote on initiatives - reflecting their more controversial 
nature - almost always exceeds by several percentage points the vote for constitutional 
amendments proposed by the legislature." This statement accords with the experience in other 
states. See Bone & Benedict, supra note 80, at 340 ("questions of governmental structure and 
reform bring out the lowest participation"). A 1973 tax and expenditure proposal drew a turn-
out in excess of 98%, even though it did not coincide with a candidate election. REFEREN· 
DUMS, supra note 2, at 94. 
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"threaten imminently to undermine democratic processes, 
thereby denigrating rather than serving First Amendment inter-
ests." 124 The three indicia for apathy indicate that unlimited spend-
ing for political communication does not imminently threaten the 
ballot measure process. A desire to reduce apathy cannot justify 
contribution limitations absent three findings. First, there must be 
evidence of substantial apathy. Second, there must be a causal rela-
tionship between large contributions and apathy. Third, the court 
must find that restricting political expression is an effective and con-
stitutionally permissible means for reducing apathy. The CARC 
court substituted assumptions for proof on each of these points, and 
its treatment of the apathy question must, therefore, be rejected. The 
next section will examine a final possible interest in contribution lim-
itations. 
C. Equalization 
The CARC court expressed concern not only for nonparticipants, 
but also for participants in the ballot measure process who felt that 
their contributions were insignificant. A "free marketplace" of polit-
ical ideas implies that the poor as well as the rich can effectively 
present their views. 125 The court concluded that ballot measure limi-
tations "assur[e] voters that their vote and their participation, 
whether in the form of money or services, are significant." 126 Al-
though it is not clear whether the court considered equalization as an 
independent goal or as merely another facet of the "narrow inter-
ests" problem, it apparently thought that the tendency of ballot 
measure limitations to equalize contributors' ability to participate 
had justificatory force. 
Proponents of contribution limitations argue that unrestricted 
124. First Natl. Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 762, 789 (1978). 
125. See, e.g., T. EMERSON, supra note 34, at 629: "In general, the government must affir-
matively make available the opportunity for expression as well as protect it from encroach-
ment. This means that positive measures must be taken to assure the ability to speak despite 
economic or other barriers." 
Baker, supra note 47, at 55: 
The marketplace works if and only if all people are equally able to participate in making 
or influencing the choice. Moreover, providing each person a roughly equal opportunity 
to generate equal quantities of carefully packaged messages increases the role of reason; 
the equalization neutralizes the advantages which pacfaging presently gives to well-
financed perspectives. . . . [T)he marketplace of ideas seems perfectly coherent as long 
as people have equal opportunities (e.g., equal resources) for participating. 
126. 27 Cal. 3d at 829, 614 P.2d at 747-48, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 90. The concept of significant 
participation is as vague as that of apathy. The CARC court was probably concerned, as are 
some co=entators, see note 77 supra, that soµie citizens would be demoralized because their 
participation would seem less effective than that of individuals or groups able to spend greater 
amounts of money to promote their political viewpoints. But this approach falsely assumes 
that large spenders speak with a single voice, a notion that the Supreme Court rejected in 
Bello/Ii. See 435 U.S. at 785 n.22 ("Corporations, like individuals or groups, are not homoge-
nous."). 
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spending for communication results in multiple voting, 127 or at least 
in repetition that impedes the search for "truth" in the electoral pro-
cess.128 They conclude that such limitations open the marketplace to 
diverse views. Certain language in Buckley and other recent 
Supreme Court cases supports this position. The Court has vali-
dated governmental action that "facilitate[s] and enlarge[s] public 
discussion and participation in the electoral process." 129 It applied 
this principle to uphold public financing of presidential campaigns 
and "fairness" regulation of the electronic media. 130 And in Reyn-
olds v. Sims, 131 the Court held that an individual is entitled to "an 
equally e.ff ective" voice in the political process. These decisions indi-
cate that equalization is a legitimate goal in certain contexts. 
Opponents of ballot measure limitations, on the other hand, ar-
gue that the first amendment protects political communication from 
any governmental intereference. They claim that unfettered individ-
ual expression, 132 not restrictions on speech, 133 promotes a free mar-
127. A. HEARD, supra note 28, at 648: 
A deeply cherished slogan of American democracy is "one man-one vote." . . . By their 
talents and energies, some men have always taken greater part in government than others 
and thus, in a way, cast more than one vote. Concern over the private financing of polit-
ical campaigns sterns in significant measure from the belief tliat a gift is an especially 
important kind of vote. 
128. The CARC court, for example, believed that "large contributors use their purse to 
overcome the power of reason." 27 Cal. 3d at 827, 614 P.2d at 746, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 88. 
129. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 92-93 (1976). 
130. 424 U.S. at 92-93 (upholding public financing of Presidential Campaigns). See Red 
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,377 (1969) ("The broadcaster must give adequate 
coverage to public issues . . . and coverage must be fair in that it accurately reflects the oppos• 
ing views."). 
See generally Kalven, Broadcasting, Public Policy and the First Amendment, 10 J.L. & 
EcoN. 15 (1967); Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment: Observations on 40 Years of 
Radio and Television Regulation, 52 MINN, L. REV. 67 (1967). 
131. 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964). 
132. See, e.g., z. CHAFEE, THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY 108 (1956): "(T]he First Amend-
ment and other parts of the law erect a fence inside which men can talk. The law-makers, 
legislators and officials stay on the outside of that fence. But what the men inside the fence say 
when they are let alone is no concern of the law." The Court has traditionally viewed the first 
amendment as a guarantor of unrestricted interplay of beliefs and ideas; it has often rejected 
the notion of governmental regulation designed to achieve a more "balanced" or perfect mar-
ketplace. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940): 
In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political belief, sharp differences arise, In 
both fields the tenets of one man may seem the rankest error to his neighbor. To per-
suade others to his own point of view, the pleader, as we know, at times, resorts to exag-
geration, to vilification of men who have been, or are, prominent. ... But the people of 
this nation have ordained in the light of history, that, in spite of the probability of excesses 
and abuses, these liberties are, in the long view, essential to enlightened opinion and right 
conduct on the part of the citizens of a democracy. 
See United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362,372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943) (Hand, J,) ("[The 
first amendment] presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a 
multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection. To many this is, and 
always will be, folly; but we have staked upon it our all."). 
133. Even Emerson, who argues for affirmative state efforts to promote the "system of 
expression," points out that: 
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ketplace of ideas. Ballot measure limitations allow the state to 
decide that an individual's expression conflicts with its view of an 
ideal marketplace. The Supreme Court, however, has never sanc-
tioned an attempt to equalize political influence by restricting 
speech.134 In fact, Buckley explicitly rejected this approach: "[T]he 
concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of 
our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly 
foreign to the First Amendment."135 The Court reaffirmed this posi-
tion in Be!!otti.136 Several additional objections to equalization 
through ballot measure limitations can also be raised. 
First, ballot measure limitations "equalize" only haphazardly. 
Ballot measures are only one part of the electoral process, and con-
tributions to ballot measure committees are only one form of ballot 
measure spending. Ballot measure limitations do not limit direct ex-
penditures, which are protected under Buckley; they "equalize" only 
the expression of contributors to ballot measure committees. 137 
Courts should not underestimate the importance of this point. Ballot 
measure limitations will not reduce the political expression of 
[W]hile certain limited forms of control may improve the performance of the system, such 
controls cannot be imposed on any broad scale without destroying the system altogether. 
This is true not only because the government has no authority to determine the content or 
value of particular expression. Even if the regulation does not touch on such matters, the 
mere presence of the government, with its apparatus for investigating, deciding and en-
forcing, is repressive and likely to inhibit the system. 
T. EMERSON, supra note 34, at 633-34. 
134. See, e.g., Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (invalidating 
a state statute requiring newspapers to make available space at no cost for replies from candi-
dates criticized in editorials). 
135. 424 U.S. at 48-49. 
136. First Natl. Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790-91 (1978) (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. l, 48-49 (1976)). 
137. The CARC court's reasoning that the contribution limitations passed muster under 
the first amendment, or were less onerous than they might be, because individuals remained 
free to spend directly, 27 Cal. 3d at 829, 614 P.2d at 748, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 90, runs counter to 
several Supreme Court decisions. In Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (per curiam), 
for example, the Court reversed a conviction under a flag misuse statute for hanging a flag with 
a peace symbol attached upside down in a private residence. The Court rejected the lower 
court's reasoning that the state could prevent the defendant from treating the flag as he did 
because there were "thousands of other means available" for expressing his position. 418 U.S. 
at 411 n.4 (quoting State v. Spence, 81 Wash. 2d 788, 800, 506 P.2d 293, 301 (1973)). Similarly, 
in Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 
(1976), the Court rejected the argument that a state prohibition of prescription drug price 
advertising was justifiable because consumers could secure the information from alternative 
sources. 425 U.S. at 757 n.15. And in Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (holding 
invalid an ordinance prohibiting the door-to-door distribution of handbills where the state 
interests asserted could be achieved by less drastic means), the Court stated that "one is not to 
have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it 
may be exercised in some other place." 308 U.S. at 163. The availability of alternative chan-
nels of communication becomes relevant only when the restriction on speech arises as a result 
of government regulation that is otherwise a "reasonable time, place or manner'' regulation. 
In such cases the Court will strike down the regulation if it has the effect, even incidentally or 
accidentally, of foreclosing the dissemination of expression by certain speakers or the receiving 
of communication by certain listeners. 
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wealthy persons and groups, whose direct expenditures are large 
enough to guarantee access to the most effective modes of communi-
cation. Rather, limitations will affect persons of more modest 
means, who are unable to afford mass media communication unless 
they pool resources with others similarly situated. 138 Because limita-
tions will restrict such cooperation, they may actually impede equali-
zation. Second, the patterns of expression that contribution 
limitations alter are caused by income inequality. 139 Although the 
first amendment may not oblige the government to provide the re-
sources necessary for individuals to express political views eff ec-
tively, 140 the state could encourage political expression less 
restrictively through redistributive taxing and spending. 141 
A desire to "equalize" does not justify ballot measure limitations. 
Because of their haphazard impact, these limitations do not equalize 
political influence. They do, however, throttle political expression 142 
and aim to equalize by a means that is more drastic than use of the 
tax laws or the budget. Ballot measure limitations thus unneces-
sarily conflict with the first amendment's primary concern - protec-
tion of individual political expression. 143 
138. See note 54 supra. 
139. Income inequality is a longstanding phenomenon in this country. See generally 
Miller, Rein, Roby & Gross, Poverty, Inequality, and Co'?flict, 373 ANNALS 16 (1967). 
140. See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 36 (1973) ("[W]e 
have never presumed to possess either the ability or the authority to guarantee to the citizenry 
the most e.ffective speech or the most ieformed electoral choice.") (emphasis original). The 
Court in Rodriguez rejected the contention that unequal funding of local school systems vio-
lated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The plaintiffs argued, inter 
alia, that equal educational resources were necessary if individuals were to make "intelligent 
utilization of the right to vote." Cf. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding so-called 
"Hyde Amendment" limiting federal funding under Medicaid to abortions necessary to pre• 
serve life of mother, or in cases of rape or incest); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (uphold-
ing state refusal to provide Medicaid funds for "non-therapeutic" first trimester abortions); 
Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974) (the state need not provide counsel for indigent defendants 
for discretionary state appeals or application for Supreme Court review). 
141. Buckley specifically rejected the argument that public financing of federal campaigns 
violated the first amendment. The Court upheld the scheme under the general welfare clause, 
and merely noted that "every appropriation made by Congress uses public money in a manner 
to which some taxpayers object." 424 U.S. at 92. But cf. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ,, 431 
U.S. 209 (1977) (holding that nonmembers of public employee unions required to pay a "serv-
ice fee" in lieu of union dues were entitled to a refund of funds spent for ideological and 
political communication unrelated to collective bargaining activities). 
142. See notes 41-63 supra. The fact that a limitation does not completely prohibit expres-
sion does not seem relevant. If spending money for political communication is speech, as 
Buckley held, every dollar that the contributor is prohibited from contributing amounts to a 
restriction of expression. Moreover, the very purpose of the restriction is to limit expression. 
Ballot measure limitations therefore run afoul of the O'Brien requirement that a regulation 
affecting speech not have as its principal aim the suppression of expression. United States v. 
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968). See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 16-17; note 19 supra. 
143. Political expression lies at "the very core of the first amendment." Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. at 39 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968)). See First Natl. Bank v. 
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777 n.12 (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964)); 
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CONCLUSION 
Ballot measure limitations restrict the free speech rights of indi-
vidual contributors to the same extent as the direct expenditure limi-
tations that Buckley struck down. They restrict the use that 
individuals of modest income levels can make of the mass media and 
directly curtail the contributor's ability to associate with others for 
"effective amplification" of political views. As direct abridgments of 
"core" first amendment rights, the constitutionality of ballot measure 
limitations turns on whether they can withstand "exacting scrutiny." 
They cannot. Because they either are not furthered by the limita-
tions or are attainable by less restrictive means, none of the asserted 
state interests justify limitations. 
Only by allowing individuals to set their own upper limits on 
ballot measure contributions can courts guarantee a fair hearing to 
all sides of a referendum issue. Inevitably arbitrary state dollar limi-
tations frustrate this goal. Upholding ballot measure limitations 
would be tantamount to giving constitutional sanction to the "not 
altogether pleasing prospect that a citizen's most fundamental First 
Amendment rights may expand and contract with the Consumer 
Price Index."144 
Milkwagon Driver's Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287, 301-02 (1941) 
(Black, J., dissenting): 
I view the guaranties of the First Amendment as the foundation upon which our govern-
ment structure rests and without which it could not continue to endure as conceived and 
planned. Freedom to speak and write about public questions is as important to the life of 
our government as is the heart to the human body. In fact, this privilege is the heart of 
our government. If that heart be weakened, the result is debilitation; if it be stilled, the 
result is death. 
(Footnotes omitted). See also A. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 34, at 25; Be Vier, The First Amend-
ment and Political Speech: An Inquiry Into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. 
Rev. 299, 358 (1978). 
144. 27 Cal. 3d at 838, 614 P.2d at 753-54, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 96 (Richardson, J., dissenting). 
